OTHERS' VIEWS

OTHERS' VIEWS

This week, President Bola Tinubu set tongues wagging when he formally requested the approval of the National Assembly to secure a new wave of multi-currency loans amounting to approximately $23.5 billion, €2.265 billion, ¥15 billion, and N757.9 billion, as part of the country’s 2025-2026 external borrowing plan.

Already, a lot of citizens have expressed concerns that the country may be heading towards a debt trap, a situation in which its debt is difficult or impossible to repay, almost two decades after it achieved debt forgiveness from the Paris Club.

More worrying with this development is the fact that, at a time when the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) Governor, Olayemi Cardoso and his team are aggressively pursuing a tight monetary policy regime aimed at curbing inflation and stabilising the naira, the federal government’s push for fresh borrowing appears to contradict this policy direction. Such a move risks undermining the effectiveness of monetary tightening by injecting more liquidity into the economy through increased public spending, potentially fueling inflationary pressures, distorting market signals, and eroding investor confidence in the government’s fiscal discipline.

Precisely, the fresh proposed borrowing plan, spanning multiple international lenders and development institutions, marks one of the most ambitious external financing proposals of this administration to date and will certainly elevate the country’s existing debt stock.

As at December 31, 2024, Nigeria’s total public debt stood at N144.67 trillion, according to data from the Debt Management Office. This was a 48.58 per cent rise from the N97.34 trillion recorded by the country as at the end of 2023.

However, the Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister of the Economy, Mr. Wale Edun, has dismissed widespread claims suggesting that the country plans to borrow $25 billion within one to two years, calling such impressions as totally erroneous and misleading. He explained that the actual borrowing plan for 2025 is $1.2 billion through the DMO and up to $2 billion via the multilateral borrowing programme. These, he said, are tied to specific projects and would be disbursed over time, not in a lump sum.

“The actual borrowing for each year is contained in the annual budget. In 2025, the external borrowing component is $1.23 billion, and it has not yet been drawn. This is planned for the second half of 2025. Also, the plan is for both the federal and several state governments across numerous geopolitical zones, including Abia, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Lagos, Niger, Oyo, Sokoto, and Yobe States.

“Importantly, it should be noted that the borrowing rolling plan does not equate to an automatic increase in the nation’s debt burden. The nature of the rolling plan means that borrowings are split over the period of the projects. For example, a large proportion of projects in the 2024 – 2026 rolling plan have multi-year draw downs of between five to seven years, which are project-tied loans,” the minister stated.

Despite Edun’s clarification, the general concern is that Nigeria’s debt profile has been rising at an alarming pace. While borrowing is not inherently bad, as many nations leverage debt to fund growth, what distinguishes Nigeria’s case is the absence of a clear, measurable impact over the years, which has heightened distrust between the citizens and public office holders.

Public trust is the currency of governance. When leaders borrow in the name of national development, the people expect transparency, accountability, and results. This erosion of public trust is multifaceted, stemming from a combination of perceived corruption, lack of transparency in governance, inconsistent policy implementation, and a general feeling among citizens that their welfare is not the primary focus of leadership.

When citizens witness vast sums being borrowed with little to show for it in terms of improved public services or economic opportunities, skepticism naturally takes root. The opaqueness surrounding how loans are secured, how funds are disbursed, and the accountability mechanisms in place further fuels this distrust.

For instance, a recent revelation by civic tech organisation, BudgIT Nigeria, that it uncovered over 11,000 projects worth N6.93 trillion inserted by the National Assembly in the 2025 budget underscores growing concerns about transparency and fiscal discipline.

BudgIT had described the development as a deeply entrenched culture of exploitation and abuse, led by top-ranking members of the National Assembly, which is another means of frittering borrowed public funds meant to support national development.

This lack of transparency creates a chasm between the government and the governed, making it increasingly difficult for authorities to garner public support for necessary, albeit sometimes painful, economic reforms.

Indeed, Nigeria is not the first nation to borrow, and won’t be the last. But what distinguishes successful economies is not the size of their debt, but the clarity of their vision and the trust of their people.

This, however, is the time for other civil society groups, just like BudgIT, and indeed the citizens, to wake up, stay vigilant, and demand full accountability from those in power. We must ask the right questions about public finance, scrutinise every line of the budget, and track every amount borrowed to support governance. If we fail to act now, these massive loans meant to improve lives as had been reported in the past, could quietly vanish into private pockets, fueling corruption instead of development.

By prioritising fiscal discipline, fostering transparency, and actively working to restore the faith of its citizens, Nigeria can unlock its immense potential and build a more prosperous and equitable future for its citizens.

In the absence of trust, even the most well-intentioned policies will be met with suspicion. Therefore, as the government considers another round of massive borrowing, it must also begin the hard work of rebuilding its trust deficit.

There is supposed to be a formidable coalition of powerful regional and national political forces working to upstage President Bola Ahmed Tinubu in 2027. But this coalition isn’t coalescing and appears to be crumbling before it has even had a chance to be formed. Three major reasons account for this.

The first reason is what I call the aspirational collision of the major movers of the coalition. By that, I mean the two major power blocs behind the coalition have irreconcilably divergent ideas about who should occupy the upper end of the ticket the coalition will produce.

PDP’s Atiku Abubakar basically wants a recreation of the 2019 electoral lineup. He would be the presidential candidate, and Labor Party’s Peter Obi would be the vice-presidential candidate. It is predicated on the assumption that Atiku Abubakar, by virtue of his primordial identity, will be a magnet for northern votes.

If he is the only prominent northern candidate in 2027, he will win both Muslim and Christian votes in the region, as northern Christians trust him more than any northern Muslim politician of his generation on account of his remarkable broadmindedness, though his close association with Nasir El-Rufai, widely regarded by many northern Christians as a crass, unremorseful Christophobe because of his past actions and utterances, undermines this appeal.

Peter Obi is supposed to bring the enthusiasm and votes he got from the 2023 presidential election to the coalition. However, it appears that although Peter Obi isn’t personally ill-disposed to being Atiku’s running mate again, his support base in the South would deplete considerably should he choose to play second fiddle to a northerner this time.

The dramatic rise in his political capital in 2023 was entirely the consequence of his being the only notable Southern Christian presidential candidate in the race. Plus, the prevalent sentiment in the South is that Muhammadu Buhari’s eight-year tenure was the North’s chance to rule. The next eight years from 2023 is the South’s turn.

If Obi were to accept being Atiku’s running mate, he would be seen by people in the South, including his native Southeast, as a betrayer, as a quisling, of the region. And that would mark the irretrievable diminution of his political capital.

Yet, it is unconstitutional for Atiku to be anybody’s running mate, having been a two-term vice president before. So, there is zero possibility of Atiku agreeing to be running mate to Obi, whom he brought to national limelight by choosing him as his running mate in 2019, against the recommendation of major players in the PDP at the time.

This is an unresolvable impasse. As much as the South justifiably thinks it is its turn to produce the president until 2031, the North has been unsuccessfully calling attention to the disadvantage it has suffered as a result of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua’s death, which prematurely returned power to the South for six years.

The Atiku group’s carrot to Obi—to accept being VP in exchange for Atiku serving only one term—is informed by this logic. It somehow compensates the North’s six-year loss and promises a return of power to the Southeast, which has never produced a president (or even a vice president) since the start of the Fourth Republic.

Nevertheless, if the chatter I see on social media is any guide, Obi’s support base is unpersuaded by this. Were Obi to accept being a running mate to Atiku in 2027, many Obi supporters say they would rather sit out the election or, worse, vote for Tinubu to ensure that the presidency remains in the South.

This is complicated by the reality that, were Atiku to stay out of the 2027 presidential contest and endorse Obi, it’s unlikely to improve Obi’s electoral fortunes in parts of the North that rejected him in 2023.

The second reason the coalition is unlikely to succeed is that key northern politicians who are already positioning themselves to be Tinubu’s successor in 2031 are either not part of it or are in it to undercut it from within. There are two reasons for this.

First, an Atiku presidency would mean their aspirations to be president would be deferred by more years than a Tinubu second term. Plus, even if Atiku honors his alleged pledge to serve for only one term (which is never a guarantee, given the intoxication of power), he would hand over power to the South. That counts them out.

Second, opposing Tinubu’s second term by joining a coalition would ensure that they take themselves out of consideration for Tinubu’s support in 2031. It is self-seeking political calculation that assumes the nature and form of the outlines of the future.

The third reason the coalition would have trouble taking off is Tinubu’s own determined, single-minded, well-oiled—even state-sanctioned—effort to destroy it. I’ll only talk about one effort because, while many people may be aware of it, only a few seem to be conscious of it.

Tinubu is deploying a political propaganda tactic called the bandwagon technique. This method encourages people to act or think a certain way because “everyone else is doing it.” It appeals to the human desire to be part of the majority or to avoid being left out.

It’s a powerful technique because it leverages social pressure and the fear of missing out (FOMO). The unceasing gale of political defections of prominent political actors across the country is intended to cause Tinubu’s opponents to question their judgement and give up their opposition to him.

Even Afrobeats music icon Davido—who won well-deserved plaudits and brownie points from Igbo people a few days ago for telling a Yoruba Twitter interlocutor who questioned his outward symbolic associations with Igbo that he is “Igbo by blood”—appears to be part of this bandwagon technique.

Video records of him visiting Tinubu in the Presidential Villa and introducing well-known Igbo entertainment figures as “APC members” fit the bandwagon method perfectly. Here’s a man whom the president’s media team had tackled vigorously for his criticism of Tinubu’s government, whose uncle is a PDP governor, and who publicly identifies with the Igbo (a core stronghold of opposition to Tinubu), now openly identifying with the president at the same time that major political players in opposition parties are switching to APC. That’s unlikely to be random.

When you add this to the predominant sentiment in Nigeria that incumbents don’t lose elections, even if they actually lose them (with the exception of Goodluck Jonathan), you are looking at a systematic, coordinated effort to construct the rhetoric of inevitability around Tinubu’s second term.

A coalition of politicians who don’t offer or promise anything different from Tinubu and who have irreconcilable asymmetries in their expectations of what the coalition should produce will have a hard time overcoming Tinubu’s strategies.

This is sad because, as I previously pointed out, the conditions in the country should preclude Tinubu from even being considered for a second term. A May 24, 2025, special report I read in Vanguard by Dr. Dele Sobowale titled “Tinubu at Midterm: Who are the People Gov’t is Satisfying?” was particularly striking.

Sobowale's Consultancy conducted a nationwide survey to assess public perception of the federal government's performance. The study involved a brief verbal questionnaire posed to Nigerians across all six geopolitical zones, cutting across age, ethnicity, religion, gender, and income levels.

Participants were asked two simple yes-or-no questions: whether their lives were better now compared to two years ago, and whether they expected things to improve in the next two years.

The findings were stark. Only 3 percent of respondents said their lives had improved, while an overwhelming 97 percent said they had not. Even more striking was the pessimism about the future: just 1 percent expressed hope for improvement in the next two years, while 99 percent did not.

These results reflect a deep sense of dissatisfaction and growing despair among the Nigerian populace. In a normal setting, no government that has enabled this much misery index and that is burdened by this heavy perceptual burden should even run for a second term. But this is Nigeria.

Yesterday’s light-hearted post about African English pronunciations using the example of how Nigerians, Kenyans, and Ghanaians say the word “work” sparked a spirited conversation about the supposed “correct” way to pronounce English words.

With my 8-year-old daughter, Ramat, during the last ed-el-fitr celebration

After reading through the comments, I’ve concluded that many, perhaps most, Nigerians have been conditioned (brainwashed might be the better word) by Ghanaian teachers who came to Nigeria in large numbers during the 1970s and 1980s to teach in primary and secondary schools.

 These teachers, whether consciously or not, often instilled the idea that Nigerian pronunciations were “wrong” or inferior to Ghanaian ones. That belief is deeply flawed.

Let’s begin with a fundamental truth: there is no universally “correct” or “incorrect” pronunciation in English. 

 Within England alone, pronunciation varies dramatically from region to region. The same holds true for the United States and every other native-English-speaking country.

 Every speech community adapts pronunciation to its own linguistic environment and sociocultural peculiarities.

Second, I’ve interacted with native English speakers from different countries for over two decades now, and I can confidently say that Ghanaian English pronunciation isn’t inherently closer to native English accents than Nigerian pronunciation is.

 Ghanaian English sounds Ghanaian. Nigerian English sounds Nigerian. That’s all there is to it.

It’s true that dictionaries provide phonetic transcriptions of words, and those who learn English formally often mistake these transcriptions for definitive pronunciation standards. 

But dictionaries merely offer approximations—often based on a narrow sliver of upper-class native speakers. 

The situation becomes even more complex when you consider the wide variation within native English dialects. What dictionaries present as “standard” is usually just the speech of society’s elites who are, ironically, a small minority even in their own countries.

Standard English pronunciation is not synonymous with the “correct” English pronunciation, just as non-standard varieties aren’t “incorrect.”

For example, take Received Pronunciation (RP), often called the King’s (or Queen’s) English or BBC English. Only about 2 to 3 percent of people in England speak with an RP accent. Some estimates stretch that to 5 or 10 percent, but even then, over 90 percent of Britons don’t speak RP. 

So, to call it the only “correct” accent simply because it’s represented in UK dictionaries or on broadcast media is to erase and belittle the speech patterns of the vast majority of English speakers in Britain.

In the United States, the General American (GenAm) accent is more widely used than RP is in the UK, with estimates suggesting that about 40 to 50 percent of Americans speak a variant of it.

Still, the U.S. is teeming with other recognizable accents: Southern, Bostonian, New York, Appalachian, Cajun, and many more.

This is precisely why pronunciation doesn’t factor into what is formally defined as Standard English. 

That said, I am not suggesting that you shouldn’t strive to pronounce words in ways that make you intelligible to the widest audience possible. Communicative clarity matters.

But let’s be honest: most English speakers around the world don’t pronounce work as “wek,” nurse as “nes,” or pastor as “pasta,” as Ghanaians do. 

In fact, calling a pastor “pasta” might earn you accusations of harboring cannibalistic fantasies. We eat pasta. Pastors preach the gospel. Big difference!

Amusingly, a few hours ago, when I asked my 8-year-old daughter (who has never traveled outside the United States) which of “wok,” “wak,” or “wek” sounded most like work, she picked “wok” without the slightest hesitation.

 I swear, she even echoed what our American “referee” said during a similar conversation more than 20 years ago: that “wak” reminds her of whack—as in, to hit someone!

If you listen carefully to English spoken across Anglophone Africa, you'll notice three unmistakable "accent capitals": Nigerian, Kenyan, and Ghanaian. 

All other regional accents tend to branch out as derivatives or close relatives of this linguistic trinity. And nothing illustrates these fascinating differences quite like the word "work."

In Nigeria, it is pronounced emphatically as "wok," with the "o" booming proudly like the first sound in "all." Nigerians will tell you they’re off to "wok" with seriousness befitting an epic quest. 

Over in Kenya, however, the word undergoes a curious transformation into "wak," perilously close to "whack," as though every job involves a bit of spirited combat. 

And then in Ghana, our little stubborn brother, the pronunciation elegantly morphs into "wek," cheerfully rhyming with "check." 

Back in June 2003, these accent disparities sparked an unforgettable showdown between me and my Kenyan journalist friend, Douglas Kimani, during our days together in the United States. 

Douglas cheekily declared that Nigerians were burdened with the absolute worst English accent on the African continent. To drive home his point, he challenged me, saying, "Pronounce 'work' for me."

"Wok," I said, with Nigerian flair. Douglas erupted into uncontrollable laughter, nearly toppling over. "You mean 'wak,' my friend!" he retorted confidently.

This was too much. I responded by doubling over in hysterical laughter myself. Offended yet amused, Douglas insisted we settle this pronunciational dispute fairly. 

We approached an unsuspecting American lady, explained our accents, spelled the word for clarity, and then performed our distinct pronunciations. "Who’s closer to your own pronunciation?" Douglas asked, triumphantly certain of victory.

Without hesitation, our American "referee" sided with me. She gently explained to Douglas that "wak" would sound to an American like "whack," meaning either to hit forcefully or, if spelled "wack," something bizarre or totally uncool. 

Douglas’s expression was priceless. It was a cocktail of disbelief, mock outrage, and good-humored defeat.

From that day on, our banter took a hilarious turn. Each time I saw Douglas, I’d tease, "So, my friend, how is wak in Kenya today?" and he would gamely respond in a wildly exaggerated Nigerian accent, "Ah, wok is perfectly fine o!"

Lately, whenever I recall our playful linguistic duels, my thoughts drift amusingly to Rihanna's global hit, "Work." 

Imagine if Rihanna had adopted the Kenyan pronunciation, singing passionately, "Wak, wak, wak, wak, wak, wak!" Her song would have transformed instantly into an anthem fit for a flock of quacking ducks!

Now, if you'll excuse me, it's time I got back to "wok." Or should I say "wak"…or "wek"?

Mauritania’s Dr Sidi Ould Tah, elected the 9th president of the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group on 29th  May 2025, is an economist with an impressive track record and experience in international finance and banking.
However, his coming coincides with a period of a fragmented and conflict-prone world, with Africa facing tough socioeconomic and environmental challenges.
Some of the problems are not new, but according to  Report on Africa 2024 by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the challenges “are unprecedented in scale, complexity, and inter-connectedness, and they impede Africa’s attaining the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the African Union’s Agenda 2063.”
“These global challenges render business-as-usual strategies unsustainable. A new approach is required to accelerate wealth creation, reduce inequality, and achieve more equitable and sustainable development,” the Report warned.
Even with the 2021 inauguration of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), championed by the AFREXIMBANK, which is expected to facilitate the integration of all countries on the continent, many of the challenges persist, including poor infrastructure, transportation, logistics and border controls, which hinder movement and trade.
The UNECA Report showed that Africa’s share of global trade remained sluggish at 3%, indicating that not much has changed over the past decade.
Perversely, intra-African trade as a share of global trade declined from 14.5% in 2021 to 13.7% in 2022, and over the same period, intra-African exports dropped from 18.22% to 17.89%, while intra-African imports dipped from 12.81% to 12.09%
These distressing statistics suggest that the quality of life of people in Africa could not have improved since the inauguration of High-5s at the AfDB a decade ago.
Critics, quoting the World Bank Report 2025, argue that last year, while sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 16% of the world’s population, 67% of its people were living in extreme poverty.
The Report showed that the number of people in sub-Saharan Africa living below the international poverty line of USD$ 2.15 per person per day increased from 413 million in 2015 to 464 million in 2025.
Tah, who holds a Ph.D., Master's and B.A. degrees in Economics, an excellent command of Arabic, French, and English, and a working knowledge of Portuguese and Spanish, has his job cut out for him.
At 61, he is the same age as the AfDB, which was set up in 1964.
The Mauritanian economist boasts almost four decades of experience in African and international finance, including as the president of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) since 2015. He led the bank to quadruple its balance sheet, securing a AAA rating, and positioning it among the top-rated development banks focused on Africa.
Tah defeated four other candidates to clinch the coveted AfDB top position -Amadou Hott (Senegal), Samuel Maimbo (Zambia), Mahamat Abbas Tolli (Chad) and Bajabulile Swazi Tshabalala (South Africa).
He will assume duties in September for five years, succeeding Nigeria’s Dr Akinwumi Adesina, who would have completed his two terms of five years each.
At the Bank’s Annual Meetings held in its Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire headquarters, Niale Kaba, Chairman of the Board of Governors and Ivorian Minister of Planning and Development, announced Tah as the winning candidate with more than 50.01% of both the regional and non-regional votes, as required by the Bank’s statute.
According to his profile, the former Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance of Mauritania had served in various senior positions in multilateral institutions and “led crisis response, financial reform, and innovative resource mobilization for Africa, including the establishment of BADEA’s USD$1 billion callable capital programme for African Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).”
His election is at a crucial stage of the AfDB Group’s six-decade history.
While Africa has remained resilient despite climate shocks, economic disruption, and a shifting geopolitical landscape, financial and economic experts have warned that the Bank Group’s High-5s would require drastic restructuring for the continent to stand any chance of achieving the African Union’s Agenda 2063 targets and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
The new AfDB head started his career as an expert at the Mauritanian Bank for Development and Commerce (BMDC) (1984-1986); served as a financial analyst at the Food Security Commission (1986), and as Administration and Finance Manager of the Municipality of “Nouakchott” (1987).
From 1988-1996, he was an Advisor to the Director General and Director of the Internal Auditing Department in the “Nouakchott” Port Authority and also worked as a Financial Analyst at the Khartoum-based Arab Authority for Agriculture, Investment and Development (AAAID) (1996-1999).
Tah held the position of advisor to the Mauritanian President and the Prime Minister (2006-2008), before being appointed Minister of Economy and Finance and later Minister of Economic Affairs and Development, before taking up the BADEA top job in 2015.
Following Sudan’s political crisis, Tah supervised the seamless relocation of BADEA’s headquarters from Khartoum to Riyadh, as part of a crisis management measure to ensure institutional continuity.
He also represented his country on the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Board of Governors and other Regional and International Development Finance Institutions such as the World Bank’s International Financial Corporation (IFC), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). AfDB and the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF).
A recipient of the Grand Officer in the National Orders of Burkina Faso and Niger, and Officer of the National Order of the Lion of Senegal, Tah ran for the AfDB presidency on four Cardinal points, to:
- Consolidate the Bank’s Financial Capacity
“Under my leadership as president of the African Development Bank Group, the AfDB will not limit ambition to its available capital. I will utilise callable capital, attract private co-financing, and enhance our impact using structured instruments that align with Africa’s needs.”
- Deliver Results at Scale
“In development, scale is not just an aspiration; it is a test. I will transform AfDB from fragmented pilot projects to flagship interventions that have a multi-country reach, a real implementation framework, and measurable results.”
- Strengthen Institutional Credibility
“Institutions succeed or fail based on the confidence they command. Under my leadership, the AfDB will restore this confidence through clear fiduciary standards, skilled staff, and predictable governance,” and,
 - Deepen Partnerships and Global Relevance
“The next AfDB President must speak to investors in Riyadh, Beijing, and Nairobi with equal fluency. I bring a partnership model built not on aid but aligned capital and shared purpose.”
Beyond rhetoric and election campaign slogans, the international economic and financial volatility, compounded by the global North’s external aid cuts and tariff wars vis-à-vis Africa’s weak bargaining position, will test the elasticity of the experience and financial management skills of the AfDB’s new head.
The AfDB Bank Group comprises three entities: the African Development Bank, the African Development Fund and the Nigeria Trust Fund. Its shareholders are 54 African countries or regional members, and 27 non-African countries or non-regional members.
The Bank’s past presidents since its inception in 1964 are:
Mamoun Beheiry (Sudan), 1964-1970
Abdelwahab Labidi (Tunisia), 1970-1976
Kwame Donkor Fordwor (Ghana), 1976-1980
Willa Mung’Omba (Zambia), 1980-1985
Babacar N’diaye (Senegal), 1985-1995
Omar Kabbaj (Morocco), 1995-2005
Donald Kaberuka (Rwanda), 2005-2015, and,
Dr. Akinwumi Adesina (Nigeria), 2015-2025.
The 2025 Annual Meetings were themed: “Making Africa’s Capital Work Better for Africa’s Development.”
 
Paul Ejime is a Media/Communications Specialist and Global Affairs Analyst

I was one of the seven journalists invited to interview Gov. Umo Eno in Uyo on May 29 as part of his midterm anniversary activities. It was held at Akpan Isemin Hall in Government House and attended by the deputy governor, Senator Akon Eyakenyi; Secretary to the State Government, Enobong Uwah and several senior officials. The hall was packed with journalists and members of civil society organizations. Broadcast journalist Michael Bush moderated the interview while Mrs Mandu Essienobong (AKBC); Itoro Columba (Bridge TV); Oku Ekpenyong (NTA); Miriam Daniel (TVC); George Iniabasi Essien (Comfort FM) and I grilled the governor. It was an intense and wide-ranging two-and-a-half hour engagement and, undoubtedly, the most grueling interview session the governor has had since he assumed office. We asked about 20 questions on virtually every aspect of the administration’s blueprint. Only three questions were taken from the audience due to time constraint. Gov. Eno remained calm and spoke with passion and clarity of thought. He scored himself ‘’above 50%’’ when we asked him to evaluate his performance himself, but stressed that he would prefer to be assessed by the citizens.

The programme started at 2.45pm with a brief remark from the Commissioner for Information, Aniekan Umana, who stated that the event was an important media engagement through which the governor would speak to Akwa Ibom people across the world. I asked two questions on insecurity in our waterways and the true position of government’s finances. Gov. Eno explained steps taken to make our waters safer for travelers and fishermen, and noted that the government had ordered for two luxury boats that would convey passengers between Oron and Calabar, bringing back the glorious days of water transportation which we had in the 1070s. On the management of our finances, he said that he had created a savings account in which the government saves money every month. ‘’The state saves money and meets its contractual obligations on time. We have a cash flow plan that we follow’’, he said, noting that having been in business for over 25 years before his election, he has a good grasp of our to manage resources. He then launched into recent misleading press reports on the revenue of the government. An Uyo-based paper had reported that Akwa Ibom State earns N200 billion a month, a patently false claim based on the reporter’s misunderstanding of financial statements. The reporter had misinterpreted ‘’carried forward balance’’ in a financial report as an income line.

The governor noted that such an erroneous reporting usually creates unintended problems for the government as neighbouring states would assume that the enhanced revenue is earned from crude oil wells ceased from them. ‘’This particular misleading news story was very troubling as a governor of an oil-producing state was brandishing the newspaper in a meeting in Abuja, claiming that Akwa Ibom had ceased its oil wells and that’s why we are earning N200 billion in a month’’, the governor said.

He noted that he has no intention of gagging the press, but advised journalists to be more meticulous in covering government affairs, especially financial matters as many people depend on media reports to form impressions and pass judgments. I started my journalism career 37 years ago as a Finance Reporter in a national newspaper and I can confirm that interpreting and reporting financial data could pose a problem for some journalists. But I expect every journalist, even if he read History & Anthropology in the university, to know that a balance carried forward from a previous accounting period is not a fresh income. I am considering working with the NUJ to organize basic courses on financial analysis for the journalists in Akwa Ibom.

Michael Bush’s question on what have been the major surprises the governor has met in office also drew an interesting answer. The expectation from some people that government’s money should be shared to them has been a major shocker, the governor responded. ‘’There are some people, maybe among the youths, who just wake up every morning and monitor Government House gate to see the number of bullion vans coming in with cash to be shared to them’’, he said to the amusement of the audience. He advised the youths to make the best use of the various empowerment programmes to improve their skills and businesses.

Of all the 23 questions asked, there was only one that Eno refused to answer. When will he move to the APC? His looming defection has been a subject of discussions in the state among every section of the populace. It has seized the imagination of the citizens and divided opinions, but almost everybody has conceded that the internal crisis in the PDP could be a threat to a governor seeking reelection.

The State Chairman of the NUJ, Amos Etuk, who is leaving office in July after serving two terms, gave the vote of thanks. He commended the governor for supporting the media through many initiatives such as contributing to the building of the auditorium at the NUJ Secretariat; construction of a new headquarter building for the AKBC (the government-owned broadcaster) and planning to turn it into a cable TV.

As the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) commemorates its 50th anniversary in 2025, the moment calls for both celebration and sober reflection. Founded on May 28, 1975, with the lofty vision of regional integration, economic cooperation, and collective security, ECOWAS was conceived as a panacea to the socio-political and economic woes of West Africa. Half a century later, the regional bloc finds itself navigating one of the most turbulent chapters in its history.

The recent exit of three key member states, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, on January 29, 2025, has cast a long shadow over the golden jubilee celebrations. Their withdrawal, following prolonged tensions between the ECOWAS leadership and these military-led governments, underscores the fragility of the union and raises uncomfortable questions about its relevance, resilience, and roadmap for the future.

To understand the gravity of the current crisis, one must examine the journey so far. Over five decades, ECOWAS has made commendable strides. It has established a free trade area and a common market, created institutions like the ECOWAS Court of Justice and the ECOWAS Parliament, and played pivotal roles in peacekeeping missions across the sub-region, including in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and The Gambia.

 

The protocol on free movement of persons, goods, and services remains one of ECOWAS’s most celebrated achievements. It has empowered millions of West Africans to live and work across borders, enriching the socio-cultural and economic tapestry of the region. The ECOWAS Passport is symbolic of a shared regional identity, an ambitious dream of African unity long before the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was even conceived.

However, these gains have often been undermined by internal contradictions. ECOWAS has struggled with inconsistency in enforcing democratic norms, a weak response to human rights violations, and a perceived overreach in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Accusations of elitism and disconnect from the grassroots have further dented its image.

The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, now united under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), is not just a protest. It is a political earthquake. These countries, each governed by military juntas, cited a lack of support, respect, and solidarity from ECOWAS. They argued that rather than being assisted during their moment of transition, they were sanctioned and isolated, pushing them into an alternative regional alignment.

 

Critics of ECOWAS argue that its knee-jerk reaction to coups often lacks nuance. By swiftly imposing sanctions, the bloc inadvertently punishes already suffering populations and drives these states further into geopolitical alternatives like Russia and China, which offer strategic partnerships without lectures on democracy.

To many observers, the exit of these three states is not just about juntas versus democracy. It is about a deeper crisis of confidence in ECOWAS. A significant portion of the populations in these countries support their military regimes, not because they reject democracy, but because they see the previous civilian governments, often backed by ECOWAS, as corrupt, ineffective, and out of touch.

At this juncture, it is expedient to conjecture that the future of ECOWAS rest on three likely scenarios that cut across fragmentation and irrelevance, reform and reinvention coupled with coexistence and competition.

 

Explanatorily put, if the current trend of disunity persists, ECOWAS risks becoming a toothless bulldog, an institution with grand pronouncements but little influence. More member states could align with the Sahel bloc or choose to drift toward nationalistic isolation. Without trust and unity, the core idea of regional integration collapses.

In a similar vein, the current crisis could become a catalyst for radical introspection and reform. ECOWAS must re-examine its governance structures, sanction mechanisms, and methods of engagement. Instead of isolating errant members, a dialogue-based, inclusive approach should be prioritized. The bloc must also reform to reflect grassroots concerns, not just the interests of heads of state.

Also, a more realistic scenario may involve ECOWAS continuing to exist alongside alternative regional alliances like the AES. In such a configuration, competition may spur institutional reforms and efficiency. However, it could also lead to policy conflicts, trade barriers, and duplicated efforts, hardly ideal for a region already grappling with poverty, insecurity, and underdevelopment.

 

Given the backdrop of the foregoing likelihoods, it is germane to ask, “What must be done?” The answer cannot be farfetched as there is no denying the fact that for ECOWAS to survive and remain relevant beyond its golden jubilee, it must adopt a bold, new mindset.

In a similar vein, there is an urgent need to put the people first within the scheme of ECOWAS. This is as the real strength of ECOWAS lies not in presidential palaces or summit resolutions but in the people of West Africa. Therefore, policies must reflect their needs that cut across jobs, security, education, health, and dignity. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the language of sanctions must give way to solutions.

Also, there is the need for the embracement of multipolar engagement. In fact, ECOWAS must accept that the days of sole Western alignment are over. Its member states, especially in the Sahel, are exploring relations with China, Russia, Turkey, and others. ECOWAS should play a facilitative role, not a gatekeeping one.

 

In fact, after the Golden Jubilee, the leadership of ECOWAS should embark on strengthening institutions, rather than strengthening individuals. Too often, ECOWAS has been hijacked by a few dominant leaders. Again, its institutions, parliament, court, commission, must be strengthened to act independently, with transparency and accountability.

In fact, there is an urgent need for the tackling of insecurity as a regional challenge. Terrorism, banditry, and organized crime are no longer national problems. They crisscross borders and demand a coordinated regional response. The AES nations’ frustration partly stems from a perception that ECOWAS abandoned them in their darkest hours.

Without a doubt, fifty years is a milestone worthy of celebration, but ECOWAS cannot afford to be lost in nostalgia. The anniversary must be a moment of reckoning. It must ask the tough questions: Is ECOWAS still a “community” in the true sense of the word? Can it evolve beyond being a club of presidents into a union of people? Will it take the exit of three sovereign states as a wake-up call or dismiss it as political noise?

 

The future of ECOWAS depends on what it chooses to become in this critical moment. West Africa is at a crossroads. Unity is no longer guaranteed, but neither is disintegration. What remains certain is that a reinvented, inclusive, and responsive ECOWAS is not only possible, it is urgently necessary.

Your Excellency,

Today, I write to you not as a critic but as a patriot—one deeply concerned about the state of our beloved nation. I write as a citizen who believes in the urgent necessity of a national rebirth—a renaissance of values, leadership, and collective purpose. My hope is that millions of our compatriots, at home and abroad, will begin to experience a unity that transcends division and a renewed commitment to our shared destiny.

Your Excellency, I also write as a stakeholder—someone who played a significant and active role in the journey that brought Your Excellency to the presidency of our dear country. As we formally mark the midpoint of your administration this May 29, we stand at a historic juncture—one that invites reflection, responsibility, and resolute action.

 

One of the most visible consequences of our national stagnation is corruption. It has permeated virtually every layer of society—draining public resources, undermining institutional trust and sustaining a culture of impunity. This systemic ailment continues to stunt development and frustrate the legitimate aspirations of our people.

Nigeria is a nation rich in potential—blessed with human capital, natural resources, and cultural vibrancy. Yet we have, for too long, underperformed. The causes are many: poor governance, inconsistent policy, fragile institutions, and the erosion of national values. The consequences are stark—manifesting in economic hardship, social instability, and widespread disillusionment.

Expectations for the Years Ahead

 

As over 200 million Nigerians look to the second half of your tenure with cautious hope, we are at a moment of critical introspection. This midterm point presents an opportunity to recalibrate—to assess what has worked, acknowledge what has not, and align with the vision of Renewed Hope that inspired many at the start of this journey.

We need more than reforms—we need a new national mindset. One that rewards productivity over piety, innovation over consumption, and service over status. In a world marked by volatility and uncertainty, Nigerians are yearning for clear leadership, policy consistency, and a sense of purpose that speaks to both their material and moral aspirations.

Your Excellency, history watches. And so does posterity. May this season of reflection inspire a season of renewal—not just in policy, but in the soul of the nation.

 

With utmost respect,

Richard ODUSANYA


 

For a region that was still trying to come to terms with the JAMB’s bungling of the tertiary institutions’ entrance exams in the zone, a fresh mistreatment, just a month after, is a jolt too many. The JAMB’s refusal to disclose the actor(s) behind the ruinous human error on southeast candidates’ scripts has been interpreted by some, as hints of a plot. Not surprisingly, the expose of the southeast’s exclusion from federal government’s N3.2t irrigation plan, left many asking, what is all this? The ignominy echoed by the revelation was shocking, beyond words, for others. And yet for some others, it was a painful moan of not again; not again. How could this happen? And six days after the alert on such a major contention, there has been no word on the subject by the federal ministry of water resources and or any other agency saddled with the responsibility. Where is the sensitivity to inclusive governance?

The plight of the southeast was brought up in the Senate by Senators Kenneth Eze, Orji Uzor Kalu and Osita Ngwu. In a motion that was stepped down at the last minute to pave way for engagement with concerned authorities, Senator Kenneth Eze (Ebonyi State) cited the omission of the southeast in N38b irrigation projects in the 2025 budget as inequitable. He faulted the non inclusion of Anambra – Imo River Basin Development Authority as inconsistent with a nationwide irrigation initiative. In the course of contributions to the motion, the Ivo Dam, Ebonyi State, Uzuakoli, Igbere, and Abba dams, Abia State, were identified as other irrigation projects in the zone qualifying for the N38b fund. ThisDay, May 23, 2025, reported that Senate Leader, Opeyemi Bamidele advised that the matter be brought back to plenary for appropriate legislative action after Senate leadership interface with the Minister of Water Resources.” The publication stated that “in an attempt to calm the angry lawmakers, Deputy Senate President Barau Jibrin, described the situation as likely an administrative omission.”

We cannot fail to commend the action of the referenced southeast senators as well as Senate officers. Their expressed concern and responsiveness speak to a sense of responsibility. While it is hoped that the needful will be done at the shortest possible time, it’s even more important to look at the climate that has shaped the controversy. Yes, there is a possibility, that the sidelining of the southeast was an “administrative omission” as the Deputy Senate President, Barau Jibrin suggested. The likelihood would stand if the incident was an isolated one. In such accidental circumstances, the urge to issue unreserved apologies would be strong; so strong that a prompt pacification would have followed the embarrassing disclosure. But no dice; no clarifications, no pledge of investigations from the concerned institutions. Alas, marginalisation of the southeast is not an occasional occurrence in Nigerian government and politics. It goes back to 1970, beginning with post war, restrictive measures which reduced the Igbo to minority in every sphere of public life in Nigeria. The trend reached nauseating levels under general Sani Abacha’s rule and retired general Mohammadu Buhari’s presidency.

 

The systemic disadvantages faced by the southeast in power and resource allocations are persisting under the Bola Tinubu government.
While not traveling the disdainful road of Buhari’s a dot in a circle, the current administration has still not been fair to the southeast. In it’s 49 man cabinet, the southeast has five ministers in a make up of six zones. Out of 33 substantive ministers distributed across six geo – political zones, the southeast has only two full fledged ministers.

A distribution of 20 military, paramilitary and other security appointments released by the Presidency in November 2024 showed the northwest clinching eight slots; followed by southwest with five; north central closely following with four positions; northeast three slots and southeast and southsouth rocking the bottom with one bar each. And in the latest round of appointments on Friday, May 23, 2025 the southeast was once more shortchanged. Of 21 headship of federal agencies announced by Bayo Onanuga, Special Adviser, Media, the southeast got only two positions in the persons of Anyim Pius Anyim and Ken Nnamani.

A more disturbing picture emerges in the area of project undertakings by the immediate past dispensation. Characteristically, the authorities neglected the southeast in the multi-million-dollar AKK Gas Pipeline Project (NGEP) and the National Gas Masterplan, which runs from Kogi State through Kaduna, Kano and Niger Republic. The region’s peripheral inclusion in the $5.8b rail modernisation plan was reduced to narrow gauge rather than the standard gauge tracks designed for other parts of the country. But the earth – shaking dose of marginalisation was dropped recently by Works Minister, Senator Dave Umahi. On Thursday, May 22, 2025, www.channelstv.com posted the story “Tinubu’s Government Inherited No Projects in the Southeast.” The damning report quoted the Works Minister as saying the administration inherited “almost no projects” in the southeast on assuming office. Yet, at the time of this near – boycott of the southeast, “President Tinubu inherited 2604 ongoing projects in the works sector at a total value of N13t.” The report noted however that with the advent of the Tinubu administration, Owerri – Onitsha, Enugu – Onitsha and Abakaliki – Enugu roads are currently under construction. There we have it, from the most competent authority on the subject. That for the merciful change of government two years ago, the southeast was condemned to watch as outsider as other parts of the country benefited from N13t infrastructure works. Now, if it could happen in the Works Ministry, why can’t it happen in some ministries and agencies? If the southeast could be shut out in a programme with such humongous budget, would she fare better in lower cost, less publicised national undertaking?

 

Against the background of a recurring, structural marginalisation of the southeast, the zone’s skipping in the national irrigation projects does not lend the impression of an “administrative omission.” In the estimation of supremacists, the southeast became a minority and junior partner after the war. Fifty – five years is more than sufficient time to orientate groups with a mindset and to socialize society on false consciousness. The perception of the southeast as an inferior entity has taken hold in the spheres of Nigerian government and politics. Without bold moves to implement the spirit and letters of federal character principle in government, emphasized with sanctions on violations, discrimination against disadvantaged groups as the southeast, look set to continue. If the under recognition of the southeast was not deliberate, what stopped the use of statutory lists in planning and execution of government policies? In the many cases of exclusion or disproportionate allocations to the southeast, what happened to the traditional mechanisms for checks and review? The national assembly has largely abdicated it’s responsibility in the quest for a just and balanced federation. Certain categories of presidential appointment require the Senate’s approval. Yet, the Senate since inception of the Fourth Republic has not used it’s leverage to correct appointments that negate the federal character principle. In the instant agro – dam projects, the Senate will do well to ensure proper investigation and necessary disciplinary measures. Ignoring the marginalisation outcry would be shoring up Nnamdi Kanu’s appeal.

As Nigeria commemorates May 29, the day that symbolically marks our return to civilian rule, there is no more appropriate time for sober reflection and national soul-searching. It is a day drenched in symbolism, a day when Nigerians ought to celebrate democracy, yet we do so under the shadows of unfinished business. Kola Abiola’s bold and timely opinion piece, “IBB’s A Journey in Service: A Substantive Response”, published on May 28, 2025 in some selected news platforms, could not have come at a more appropriate moment.

The Federal Government should do more than merely mark this day with rehearsed speeches and empty slogans. Instead, it must embrace Kola Abiola’s clarion call to action, a call grounded in history, soaked in sacrifice, and propelled by the moral imperative to correct the wrongs that have marred Nigeria’s democratic journey since the June 12, 1993 election.

What Kola Abiola laid bare is not just a personal grievance, nor is it a mere historical recounting. It is a damning indictment of Nigeria’s failure to reconcile with its past. It has been over three decades since that election, yet the scars remain open, not because time has failed to heal, but because the Nigerian state has consistently refused to apply the balm of truth, justice, and official accountability.

 

June 12, 1993, was not an ordinary day. It was the day when Nigerians, across ethnic, religious, and regional divides, united to elect Chief M.K.O. Abiola as President in what is widely acknowledged as the freest and fairest election in our history. Yet, in one fell swoop, that victory was erased by military fiat. It was not just MKO who was robbed, the entire Nigerian populace was betrayed.

To President Muhammadu Buhari’s credit, he finally gave institutional recognition to the stolen mandate. His 2018 declaration that honored MKO Abiola posthumously with the GCFR title and named June 12 as Democracy Day was a long-overdue but commendable gesture. But as Kola rightly notes, this was just the beginning.

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, who himself was a major NADECO figure and political exile during the military era, bears a unique historical burden. As the current custodian of Nigeria’s democratic project, and someone who intimately understands the cost of that struggle, Tinubu should take the baton from Buhari and finish the race. That finish line includes recognizing all the foot soldiers of the June 12 movement: Alhaja Kudirat Abiola, Chief Alfred Rewane, and countless journalists, civil society actors, and nameless Nigerians who paid with their lives and freedom.

 

Kola Abiola’s frustration is justified when he questions whether Nigerians have truly learned any lessons from the June 12 tragedy. The truth is, we have not. If anything, we are dangerously close to rewriting or forgetting history altogether. A nation that forgets is doomed to repeat its errors. Already, the political space is again riddled with impunity, electoral manipulation, and the subversion of public will. The lessons of June 12 are being disregarded by a new generation of political elites who neither know nor respect the path that brought us here.

That is why the inclusion of June 12 in the national curriculum is not just a symbolic suggestion, it is a strategic necessity. With over 65% of Nigeria’s population being under the age of 45, most of them have no lived memory of that day. If we do not educate them truthfully, we are allowing our collective conscience to erode. That is a luxury Nigeria can no longer afford.

It is disheartening, though not surprising, that after 32 years, General Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) still dances around full accountability. His recent book and speech offer selective disclosures. While he finally admits that June 12 was sabotaged by internal forces, his refusal to name names,  especially those still alive, reinforces the impression that his priority is self-preservation, not national healing.

 

Let us be blunt: IBB’s fear of naming the living conspirators, while boldly naming the dead like General Sani Abacha, reeks of cowardice and manipulation. How can we claim to confront our history while sanitizing it for public consumption? If General IBB truly seeks redemption, he must go beyond vague confessions and provide concrete facts. Nigeria deserves the full story, not another round of half-truths wrapped in military euphemisms.

Kola Abiola also raised a lesser-discussed but equally devastating aspect of the June 12 fallout: the economic destruction targeted at MKO Abiola’s businesses. Concord Press, Summit Oil, Abiola Farms, these were not just businesses, they were institutions that employed over 15,000 Nigerians. Their systematic dismantling not only destroyed livelihoods but crippled economic structures that had national relevance. In a country still grappling with massive unemployment, the intentional economic sabotage of Abiola’s empire deserves formal redress.

This also raises a larger question: should victims of political injustice in Nigeria continue to suffer in silence while perpetrators enjoy state pensions and perks? Justice is not just about apologies; it is about restitution.

 

To mark May 29 meaningfully, the Federal Government must act on Kola Abiola’s proposals. We need a National Monument dedicated to the June 12 struggle, a space that immortalizes not just MKO Abiola, but every other martyr and survivor of that dark chapter. Furthermore, we must open a national register to formally recognize victims, both named and unnamed. Nigeria must show, in words and in concrete action that it respects those who fought for her democracy.

President Tinubu must resist the temptation to reduce May 29 to a ceremonial ritual. His administration, which owes its very political genesis to the fallout of June 12 and the NADECO struggle, must take bold steps to complete the arc of justice. This is not just about MKO Abiola. It is about institutionalizing historical justice and teaching future generations that democracy is not handed down, it is fought for, and those who fight for it must be honoured.

As Kola Abiola so poignantly noted, governance is a continuum. And where one administration starts a process of national healing, another must continue and complete it.

 

This May 29 should not be another hollow Democracy Day. It must be the day we finally say: never again. Never again will the will of Nigerians be discarded. Never again will we bury our heroes without honour. Never again will we allow a stolen mandate to be swept under the carpet of convenience.

The Federal Government must hear Kola Abiola, not out of sympathy, but out of duty. Nigeria’s democracy demands it. Her history demands it. And her people deserve it. God bless Nigeria.

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