In my column last week, I discussed how Trump’s victory could impact on Africa, noting that his presidency might not be as bad for Africa as generally thought.  This week I will explore further how his election as the 47th President of the United States could possibly affect the Russo-Ukraine war. The war has been going on since February 2022.

The general assumption is that Trump would pursue a somewhat isolationist policy within the framework of his campaign slogan of Make America Great Again, MAGA, and that he would more likely pull all the funding for Ukraine. During the campaign, Trump had derisively called Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelensky, the greatest salesman in history, implying that he had through sheer marketing skills got more than he deserved from the US and other NATO members who had been supporting his war efforts.

Trump had also suggested that he could impose a blanket 20 per cent tariff on all goods imported into the U.S., with a tariff of up to 60 per cent for Chinese products and one as high as 2,000 per cent on vehicles built in Mexico. For the European Union, meanwhile, Trump has said the 27-nation bloc will pay a “big price” for not buying enough American exports.

Zelensky himself reinforced this belief that the second coming of Trump might be bad news for Ukraine when, after a telephone conversation with Trump following the latter’s electoral victory over Kamala Harris, he told his countrymen and women that he was certain that the war with Russia would “end sooner” than it would have been once Donald Trump is sworn in as the President of the United States in January 2025. “It is certain that the war will end sooner with the policies of the team that will now lead the White House. This is their approach, their promise to their citizens,” he was reported to have said in an interview with the Ukrainian media outlet, Suspilne. He added that Ukraine “must do everything so that this war ends next year, ends through diplomatic means”.  

It should be noted that the US has been the biggest arms supplier to Ukraine in the course of the war. For instance, between February 2022 when the war began to the end of June 2024, it delivered or committed to deliver weapons and equipment worth $55.5bn (£41.5bn), according to the German research organisation, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. At present the momentum in the war seems to be with the Russians. For instance, Russia is reportedly winning significant swathes of territory in eastern Ukraine. Russia’s recent seizure of the strategically important city of Vuhledar appears to have cleared the way for possible Moscow’s advances deeper into Ukraine.

It is also reported that Moscow is preparing for an offensive using about 10,000 North Korean soldiers and about 40,000 Russians in the Kursk region of Russia, where Ukrainian forces have been struggling to defend the territory they captured during the summer. With this picture in mind, it is understandable why there are apprehensions among Ukrainians and their supporters in the war. The thinking appears to be that the country should use the remaining part of the supportive Biden presidency to do whatever they can to push back the Russians and strengthen their bargaining position before Trump becomes the substantive President in January 2025 and forces them into a negotiating table. Recently, it was announced that the Biden administration has allowed Ukraine to use long-range American missiles against targets in Russia in a move that would mark a new round of tension in the war. 

There is no doubt that Trump would like to reduce or drastically cut funding to Ukraine in keeping with his campaign promise of America First. There are however other considerations that might influence his decisions on the Ukraine war:

The first is that Trump, who regards himself as the ultimate dealmaker, is a very transactional politician – and might be open to be influenced by Ukraine or the Europeans depending on the sort of ‘deal’ he is offered. The German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who spoke with Trump after the US election, alluded to this when he reportedly told the German media that the incoming US leader had a “more nuanced” position on the war than was commonly assumed. It has been suggested that Zelensky could offer two ‘deals’ to Trump: The first will be for Ukrainian troops to replace some American units in Europe after the war in order to reduce the cost of America’s commitment to NATO. The second could be opening up some of Ukraine’s resources to the US and other Western allies. Offers such as these would, however, be contingent upon Ukraine winning the war and being admitted into NATO – which at present is far from certain.

The second consideration for Trump  is geopolitical and geo strategic. South Korea, an American ally, has reportedly supplied hundreds of thousands of artillery shells to Ukraine via the United States and had also pledged a $2.3bn low-interest loan to Kyiv. South Korea is the world’s 10th-largest arms exporter and its clients already include four nations that border Russia – Poland, Estonia, Finland and Norway. The South Korean systems are meant to supplement Patriots, the advanced American air defence systems.  It is said that the South Korean laser needs nothing but electricity – and could be deployed to the Ukrainian cities that have no Patriots or similar Western or Taiwanese air defence systems. A crucial question is whether Trump would be insensitive to deals entered with Kiev by its ally South Korea in his decision on how he wants the Ukrainian war to end or even in any decision to stop funding Ukraine’s war efforts. 

Related to the above  is the report that around 10,000 North Koreans, USA’s historical enemy, has joined the war on the Russian side, with the possibility of Belarus also joining. Following the axiom that the friend to my enemy is my enemy or at least not to be trusted, the increasing collaboration between North Korea and Russia is also a factor to be taken into consideration by Trump in his decision on the Russo-Ukraine war. Similarly, claims by Ukraine’s Western allies in September 2024 that Iran, another enemy of the West, has sent short-range ballistic missiles to Russia in a major escalation – a claim Tehran has rejected as “completely baseless and false” –  will be another consideration.  

A third major consideration that could influence Trump’s decision is the Truman Doctrine that makes it an article of faith during the Cold War for the US to seek to contain Soviet expansionism. There have been signs of America’s revival of the Truman Doctrine since the Putin presidency, especially after Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in 2014. Russia has not hidden its desire to create a multipolar world in a bid to overthrow or whittle down the influence of the current Western dominated security and governance systems around the world.  Irrespective of the nature of the personal relationship between Putin and Trump, it is unlikely that Trump would not respond to a resurgent Russia’s attempt to whittle down its global influence.

As a dealmaker, Trump is likely to be looking for a deal which would reduce the US military presence in Europe, drastically cut the military assistance to Ukraine, and give Kiev a long term hope of joining NATO in exchange for territorial concessions to  Russia. In this way, Trump would be able to publicly claim that he won the peace without undermining NATO  and without  making Russia appear the outright winner in any diplomatic negotiations to end the war.

However the war ends, it will be a mixed bag for the world and Africa globally. For instance, African countries that benefit from the current Western sanctions against Russia would have to re-adjust if Western sanctions are eased while those that have been hurt by the sanctions, especially importers of wheat and fertilizers from Russia and Ukraine, may heave a sigh of relief. 

*Jideofor Adibe is Professor of Political Science at Nasarawa State University, Keffi.