The almost eternal cycle of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC, is fuelling a widespread violence, mass displacement and extreme human suffering in the country and its neighbours like Burundi. With violence surging in Eastern DRC, almost unabated, displacement is soaring, crimes against humanity are being reported, and the fragile healthcare and support systems of the affected countries are being overwhelmed.

As armed groups fight to expand or retain their control, towns and villages are being devastated. In just five days, from January 26 to 30, an estimated 700 people were killed and 2,800 injured, according to a report by the International Rescue Committee. Since February 2025, more than 40,000 Congolese refugees have crossed into Burundi, primarily women and children, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Some reports estimated that over 9000 arrivals were recorded in a single day this week. The impact of this on the fragile social support system in Burundi can only be imagined.  Many use makeshift boats to traverse the Rusizi River, a border shared by Burundi, DRC and Rwanda. 

In Tanzania, 53 Congolese refugees reportedly sought asylum in Kigoma on February 19, 2025, marking the highest daily arrival figure this year.  The UNHCR has launched a $40.4m appeal fund to help it provide life-saving assistance to 275,000 internally displaced people in the DRC as well as support a projected influx of 258,000 refugees and returnees across Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 

The current crisis in DRC had its roots in the Rwandan civil war, which ended in 1994 with the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, RPF, a Tutsi-led army founded by Rwandan exiles in Uganda with the support of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. This led to many of the Hutu extremists who perpetrated the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis fleeing across the border, with their Interahamwe paramilitary group, to the neighbouring DRC, which was then known as Zaire. Most settled in the Kiv region, in the Eastern part of the country, along with about 1.5 million Hutu civilian refugees. The Hutu militants established militia groups aimed at waging an insurgency against the new RPF government – allegedly with the support of Mobutu Sese Seko, DRC’s then ‘maximum’ ruler.

Remarkably in the same Kiv region was also a community of ethnic Tutsis known as the Banyamulenge. Between 1995 and 1996, there were episodic large scale fights between the Hutu refugees, the Banyamulenge, the Zairian army and even the rest of the population. It was alleged that the Rwandan government, headed by Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, was funding the Banyamulenge while the Zairian government was funding the Hutus.

When Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a leading member of Mobutu’s political opposition founded Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire, AFDL, in October 1996, reportedly with the support of Rwanda, his fighters included both Tutsis and non-Tutsis. With the support of Rwanda, Laurent Kabila was able to overthrow Mobutu between February and May 1997.

As President, Kabila restored the country’s name back to Democratic Republic of Congo. But he quickly fell out with Rwandan President Paul Kagame, reportedly over the latter’s attempt to exercise excessive influence over the affairs of the country, and Kabila’s apparent inability or unwillingness to curtail the activities of Hutu militias along Rwanda’s border in the Kivu region. In 1998, the Second Congo War broke out following the deterioration of relations between Kigali and Kinshasa (the First Congo War, largely an aftermath of the 1994 genocide, lasted from 1996 and 1997).

 As relations deteriorated, Kabila ordered all foreign troops in the country, including Rwanda’s, to leave but allowed Hutu armed groups to organise at the border once again, which led to Rwanda invading the country in 1998 ostensibly to create a zone in the DRC-Rwanda borderlands as a shield against Hutu militias. Many of the neighbouring countries were sucked into the war such as Angola (which reversed its alliance following the coming to power of Kabila), Namibia and Zimbabwe which fought the Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundi militaries on the other side of the conflict. It was amid the turbulence of the Second Congo Conflict that Laurent Kabila was assassinated in a 2001 coup attempt planned by his aides and guards. He was succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila, who formally ended the Second Congo War in 2002. It was estimated that as many as three million people lost their lives during the Second Congo War.

The current round of conflict – or the Third Congo War – started in 2022 after the Rwandan forces  entered into DRC to provide military support to the March 23 Movement, M23, rebel group. Rwandan troops were accused of fighting alongside the M23 militia group against the Congolese military, FARDC, and pro-government militias. The M23, a prominent militia group made up primarily of ethnic Tutsis, had become a major force in eastern DRC by the early 2000s and Kigali was repeatedly accused of funding the group. In fact in 2013, the UN Security Council authorised a rare offensive brigade under the mandate of the UN Organisation Stabilization Mission in the DRC, MONUSCO, to support the Congolese army in its fight against M23. Unfortunately while the activities of M23 were contained following MONUSCO, other flashpoints also developed, most of them rooted in carryovers from the 1994 Rwandan genocides and the First and Second Congo Wars. 

Blessed with abundant natural resources, including having some of the world’s largest reserves of metals and rare earth minerals used to produce advanced electronics, the DRC has witnessed a proliferation of mining operations from varied interests in a classic illustration of what some social scientists call ‘resource curse’ – the tendency for countries with abundant natural resources to underperform economically and developmentally than those with fewer resources.

Apart from the devastating effects of the almost eternal crises in the DRC both on the country and its neighbours (whose social support systems are being overwhelmed by the influx of refugees from the DRC),  one can also speculate on how the wars in DRC affect  the nation rebuilding process in Rwanda. It is true that many people like to use Rwanda as a model of how a country can rebuild after a horrendous event like the 1994 genocide.

However, with the never-ending Hutu versus Tutsi wars in the DRC (each group with its own backers among the neighbouring countries), and Paul Kagame, the Tutsi leader of the country being partisan in that conflict, one can only speculate on whether the famed ethnic reconciliations in Rwanda is truly so deep that in Rwanda what matters to most people is their Rwandan, not ethnic identity – as we are all made to believe.

•Adibe is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Nasarawa State University