Certain events cannot be erased from memory and, indeed from consciousness. After nearly six decades, controversy still rages over the calamitous events of 1966. In two years, it will be 60 years since the first coup which overthrew the Balewa Administration and down the line, the governments in the Regions as well, took place. If the principal actors were to be alive today, they would be close to knocking 90 years. But the last of them, Major Adewale Ademoyega, left in 2007. Come to think of it, General Yakubu Gowon, the rallying point for a united Nigeria, will be 90 later this year. He was a Lt.-Col while the putchists were Majors in the Nigerian Army. Because of the horror and the dramatic impact of the era both on the country, and its peoples and the concomitant trust deficit it has generated among the different nationalities, it has been difficult to live down the era in our hearts. Indeed, it is firmly imprinted in the souls where some of the events so filed away come alive from time to time. In the Beyond, the intensification will even be more. It is from there that those who preoccupy themselves with the event draw, albeit, unconsciously. What can tame and erase it and progress will ensue is love, love, and more love.
As I stated last week, “The history of the earthly past, recent or contemporary, can be re-written and it is often re-written or amended to suit whims and caprices, to satisfy fancy, or to provide the correct rendition of accounts…Often the objective is to whitewash. Through the re-writing many publications thought infallible in later years are often found to have suffered from distortion as a result of limitation or deficiency of memories. You may just have to read writings about events of the last 70 years in Nigeria by different authors and you will get my drift.” People pay special attention to contentious issues spoken or written. Some of those affected by the 15 January 1966 coup and its aftermaths, directly or indirectly, are around, and more, the succeeding generation who may have been fed with different kinds of narratives. In the handling, such issues should be put in context, for better enlightenment so as not to prolong the agonies of victims or their loved ones and their succeeding generation.
This brings me to a video now in circulation in which the renowned lawyer and activist, Prof. Mike Ozekhome featured or was, perhaps, credited to him—credited because you never can say in the times we are. The video does not state the occasion the learned SAN was speaking and what the subject was. What you find is a vehement pronouncement to correct what he called “one historical profanity” that comes “from the pit of hell.” What he sought to correct was the widespread and decades-old notion that the January 15 coup was an Igbo coup. For such a sensitive subject that if mishandled is capable of opening a new chasm and triggering a season of hate, his presentation could have been less didactic and abrasive. The timing of an intervention from an eminent scholar like Mike Ozekhome is key, indeed, very important. The diatribe over the elections whipping up emotions is yet to abate. A great many, grey-haired and bald-headed today, were not just readers of history but witnesses to some of the unhappy events that occurred in our land in the not-too-distant past. There has been enough literature to help clarify issues.
Ozekhome is correct: The 15 January 1966 coup was not an Igbo coup. I had had my conviction that it was not an Igbo coup nor was it an Igbo agenda from the word go. My conviction was bolstered by books authored in particular by principal planners of the coup. In the Western Region riled by events that could self-evidently be said were the catalysts for the coup there was wild jubilation, heaving sighs of relief. It was throughout the Region. In fact, thanksgiving worship took place in churches and mosques. The distortions to what was seen as a high-minded mission of the planners by officers who backed out at the 11th hour did not alter convictions; they were only seen as black sheep.
There were unfortunate coincidences that made people and commentators go away with the impression that a regional agenda by officers from the eastern part of the country underpinned it. That the event was going to provide an opportunity for Chief Awolowo, their icon, to be released from prison was all that mattered to the people of Western Region. What characterization was anyone going to give to the putsch that an Ekiti man or woman, an Ondo man or woman or an Owo man or an Ijesha, was going to accept if by the event Awolowo was going to get out of the jailhouse? I have not mentioned Oyo, Ibarapa, Jonathan Odebiyi’s Egbado, Adegbenro’s Egbaland, and Ibadan where the Awolowo factor was a given. The coup was seen as an end to arrogance of power on display: “Whether you vote for us or not we will win! A ti t’oje bo Oloosa lowo, o ku baba eni ti yio bo! Roughly translated as ‘the sceptre of power is in the hands of the King, we will see who will seize it from our hands!’ Opposition Leader Adegbenro replied that the hand bearing the sceptre would be cut! Bi ko ba se e bo a se e ge. A o ge e ni. We will cut it, Adegbenro, said. Such was the situation in the Western Region. Major Adewale Ademoyega, one of the masterminds, alluded to this much in his book, Why We Struck: “Thereupon, the people of Western Region did not appeal to the deaf gods typified by the regional Governor, the law courts and the police. They simply recalled the days of their ancestors when unpopular rulers were removed by concerted efforts of the people.” In other words, the people of the Western Region were not just poised for a show-down; they were already engaged in the fierce battle to remove their rulers by all means. So, when the coup took place, those behind it were hailed as heroes.
Not until months later when jubilation died down that analysts began to paint the picture of the possibility of the operation as being one-sided. The perception was spread following reports from the North. While there was jubilation in the West the North was cold. The situation was getting tense by the day as reports of the killing of their beloved Premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello, and his senior wife spread. Peter Pan (Peter Enahoro), the celebrated columnist and Editor-in-Chief of the Daily Times travelled round the country and wrote about how unimpressed the Northerners were about the coup and the change of their government. Anxiety then began to mount when the checklist of actors and casualties started to come out in trickles and controversies ensued. What was the objective of the coup and how was it compromised, what was the nature of the compromise, and to what end?
By merely running one’s eyes through the table of contents of Major Adewale Ademoyega’s book, “Why We Struck,” one can have some ideas. After the Foreword, Preface, you have Chapter One—Political Prelude. He wrote on the ideology that underpinned their objective, What happened on the night of the coup, its execution, and what he has described as Ironsi’s Misadventure. Ademoyega was not just a participant; he was one of the principal planners, in the forefront. Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu may have been the leader, but Ademoyega was the coordinator of the operation throughout the country. He carried the idea of a revolution firmly ingrained in his head from his university days at the University of London. They started as three—himself, Nzeogwu, and Emmanuel Ifeajuna. They drew in two more as they were progressing. The number grew to seven, six of whom were Igbo and one Yoruba. Two more were drawn in to make altogether nine. The list was later expanded to involve some Captains. The planners were Majors, addressed by writers as The Five Majors. The addition consisted of the following: Captain Emmanuel Nwobosi, who insistently preferred Awolowo to Dr. Azikiwe as President of Nigeria in the planning if the coup succeeded; and Capt. Ogbu Oji. Those listed by Prof. Ozekhome were mostly Lts. that is 1st Lts. And 2nd Lts. Captains were three, namely Captain Gani Adeleke, Capt. Gibson Jalo and Capt. Gibson. The 2nd Lts. were Saleh Dambo and John Atom Kpera (Tiv). They were not part of the planners. They were brought in only close to the hour of action. Fola Oyewole, author of the book The Reluctant Rebel also on the coup said this much in an interview with The News Magazine of 09 January 2016. He said:
“I was not one of the master planners of the coup. It will interest you to know that by half past eleven on the night of January 14th, 1966, I had no clue about the coup. No clue whatsoever,”
The Magazine then asked: Why did they link you?
Oyewole: “Precisely, I was friendly with Emmanuel Ifeajuna who was the Brigade General and then after they had planned and done everything possible as the saying goes, some of the people who agreed to what they had agreed decided not to take part; it was a matter of getting anybody who could help and by virtue of my position, I had a telephone in my house, which was the same thing that happened to most people there. The original people started telephoning: ‘Where are you…? I want to see you.’ It was an emergency period. I was second in command to the Transport Brigade in Apapa and we were on 24 hour alert (So, like they will say something like this… something is happening in Ogbomoso blah, blah, blah, can you help? We did get instruction 24 hours. It did not come as a surprise, so that is what happened. They drove to my house at about 25 minutes to 12 and asked me to come to Ifeajuna’s house. I got there and I saw a lot of officers sitting down and they had even finished….I was not the only one. There were some other people who didn’t know until that day. For instance on the night people were briefed, a colleague was at the briefing and he told them, Look I have to consult my family. They looked at him and said, O.K. go and consult your family your family”. Just by the corridor, somebody was told to follow him thinking he might not come back, “Follow him, maybe he will be the first casualty of the coup…” He revealed that the gentleman was Capt. Gani Adeleke. He was a reluctant rebel because he was drafted from the prison in Enugu by Ojukwu to fight on the side of Biafra. He wrote the book in prison between 1971 and 1972. It was published in 1975. He revealed how he distilled and produced petrol, to move vehicles on Biafran’s side, diesel oil, and kerosene for the ordinary people.
Adewale Ademoyega says in his book: “I came to the Army with a heart pointed towards finding a solution to Nigeria’s political problems. But before I was commissioned, I had met and established a solid relationship with two young officers of the Army, Nzeogwu and Ifeajuna whose hearts pointed in the same direction as mine. It seemed as if the three of us were destined to play the big and decisive role together.”
The plan of the three of them was to put down the upheaval, the seemingly intractable upheaval in the West, and pre-empt what they saw as Balewa’s Federal Government plan to clamp down on the opposition, notable personalities such as Dr. Tai Solarin and the intellectuals from the University of Ibadan and from the University of Ife in particular regarded as the hotbed of opposition against Premier Akintola’s government which was battling for its life. Sardauna’s absence from the country on Lesser Hajj, from their observation, was what held up the Federal Government crackdown in the West as was done in the Middle Belt, using troops to suppress dissent and agitation led by Joseph Tarka in Tivland. The plan of the core three planners was to overthrow the Federal Government and the four Regional Governments of the era and end arson, looting, and brigandage and restore order and normal life in the troubled Western Region in particular. They were going to release all leading political leaders in jail such as Chief Awolowo, Lateef Jakande, Onitiri, Omisade, Josiah S. Olawoyin, Ayo Akinsanya, and Okorie-Yesin. An Air Force plane was to be on standby to go and fetch Chief Awolowo on the morning of the coup from Calabar and fly him into Lagos.
Says Ademoyega in his book: “It was in mid-November 1965 that we held the one and only formal meeting that preceded the coup. The meeting was held in Lagos, in the military quarters of Major Ifeajuna. Nzeogwu was there from Kaduna and I from Abeokuta. Major Chude Sokei was there from Enugu. Others were from Lagos, i.e. Okafor of the Federal Guards Company; Anuforo, Chuwuka from the Army Headquarters. The meeting was short. There was a consensus amongst us that something had to be done quickly to save Nigeria from anarchy and disintegration and to restore peace and unity to the nation. It was agreed that only the use of force could bring immediate end to the violence being perpetrated in many parts of the country. It was, however, agreed that the use of force should be minimal.” Their targeted leaders were only to be arrested but where arrest was resisted it was to be met with force. “Otherwise, no one was to be killed.”
It was in the execution of the coup that critical officers were less than faithful to the cause. They did not report at their duty posts on the night of the operation. Those to supply weapons and communication equipment were nowhere to be found. When you consider the failings in execution and those who disappointed their colleagues, it is easy to have it tagged an Igbo coup. They were Okafor, Ifeajuna, Obienu, and Oguchi. Ademoyega had to be asking in exasperation: “Where now was Ifeajuna? Major Obienu had defaulted altogether…Had we now lost Lagos? Had our own men deserted us? Okafor had lost the Federal Guards. Has Ifeajuna also lost the 2nd Brigade Headquarters? Obienu who was to send reinforcement from Abeokuta to Ikeja, in the account of Ademoyega “was not around; he had not returned to the station since the previous day and left no orders for troop deployment… Now we have lost Lagos and Ironsi. What a terrible situation!”
Gen. Aguiyi-Ironsi the GOC, upon escaping the approaching dragnet, mobilized counter-forces against those he termed “unfriendly forces.” He gave orders that they be arrested. He thus foiled the coup in Lagos. The orders went to different formations throughout the country, but more urgently South-West and Lagos. Before Ironsi’s orders could reach Ibadan and Kaduna, the deed had been done. What happened in Enugu and Benin? How come the political leaders of Eastern extraction escaped being killed like their counterparts elsewhere? (This will be treated in Part 2.) The killings where they took place were horrifying. The coup led to war and the horrors of war. Wise counsel, therefore, ought to have dictated caution and respect for sensibilities. My intervention is to correct misrepresentations to calm nerves in the event of an incipient rise in body temperature.
General Emmanuel Abisoye says in the Foreword to Ademoyega’s book: “At last, the missing link in our contemporary history is being supplied by Adewale Ademoyega, a former Major in the Combat Arm of the Nigerian Army. He is one of the historical trio who planned and executed the first Nigerian coup d’etat of January 15, 1966. Hitherto we had been treated to half-truths and sometimes imaginary stories by those who claimed to know the real motives behind the said coup.”