In late July 2023, the presidential guard in Niger overthrew the country’s democratically elected president, Mohamed Bazoum, and is holding him hostage. More recently, the coup leaders announced they would be trying Bazoum for high treason on the basis of undermining state security. This charge carries the death penalty under Niger’s legal code.  

This coup could undo hard-won gains for democratic governance and regional stability in West Africa. Niger has served as a geographic buffer between terrorist groups and numerous African countries, and it has been a valuable counterterrorism partner for the West. If the military junta that launched the coup is successful, al Qaeda and ISIS affiliates could metastasize across borders, significantly affecting the chances of long-term democratic stability in the area. In response to the coup, the U.S. and European Union should provide support for African-led attempts to restore and maintain peace and security in Niger and the broader region.  

The Familiar Story of Coups in West Africa  

Since the era of independence in the 1960s and 1970s, there have been over 200 attempted coups in West Africa – some lasting hours, others lasting weeks. The most recent successful coup occurred in the summer of 2022 in Burkina Faso. This pattern of coups against leaders, both democratic and authoritarian, is leading to a cycle of long-term destabilization. The fragility in West Africa that has driven these coups mainly springs from corrupt governance, inconsistent foreign involvement, economic instability, and humanitarian disasters. The Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger tri-state area of the Sahel have been particularly affected by these military coups and have suffered the consequences of regional destabilization.  

West Africa’s struggle with power and peace is built on a colonial history perpetrated by Western empires and defined by modern resource exploitation by China and Russia, who boast results-driven support (money, weapons, terrorist elimination) as they pitch and sign contracts built on personal gain. Russia has been found to have, at some level, contributed to the 2020 and 2021 coups in Mali and in Burkina Faso. Russia’s influence consists of disinformation campaigns, arms support, and assistance from private military companies. Moreover, when France’s Operation Barkhane ended in Mali, the withdrawal of French forces left a security gap that has been filled by Russian and paramilitary influence. These circumstances have led geopolitics in Africa to pivot on an East-West, post-Cold War line, even though stable peace and equitable economic relations require a different approach. 

Domestic problems often provide more fuel for coups in West Africa. Democracy has remained a superficial endeavor in West African countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Though democratic elections were held in Mali from 1964 until the 2012 Tuareg rebellion and in Niger from 1993 to the most recent coup in 2023, elections often see very low turnouts. In Mali, the last presidential election, voter turnout was around 30%, and in Niger, about 50% of those who met the voting age criteria cast their votes. In addition to low voter turnout, there is also minimal civic participation and few proper judiciary avenues, making any so-called democratic transition a transition in name only. Furthermore, surveys suggest that voter intimidation is at an all-time high, resulting in voters casting their ballots in line with key political elites and keeping them in power for multiple terms. The lack of consistent constitutional norms and peaceful power transfers has primed the Sahel region for political and military coups.  

ECOWAS and the African Union: Forces for Change 

With Nigerian President Bola Tinubu’s new role as chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), there comes a possibility for a reinvigorated, comprehensive, and regionally led approach to promoting peace and stability in West Africa (especially given Nigeria’s leading role in the region). For instance, the ECOWAS intervention in the Nigerien coup – giving leaders of the coup one week to restore Bazoum or face possible military intervention – was a relatively rare move. The last intervention that ECOWAS carried out was in 2016 during the Gambian elections.  

When he was installed as ECOWAS chairman, Tinubu vowed that the cycle of coups in Africa would be put to a halt. Tinubu stated, “We must stand firm on democracy. There is no governance, freedom, and the rule of law without democracy.” Though critics have claimed that this push for democracy comes as Tinubu is losing popularity at home and hopes to garner more favor with the international community, it is nonetheless a legitimate push for democratic practices that the international community should continue to support.  

The African Union has intervened in inter- and intra-state governance issues and conflict across Africa in the past, including when it suspended Guinea from the African Union following a coup in 2019. However, the organization’s strong action needs strong follow-through. Sustained U.S. and international assistance channeled through ECOWAS and the African Union can support such follow-through. Any ECOWAS- and African Union-led efforts to safeguard against instability must prioritize factors that will bolster regional stabilization, including good governance and regional cooperation that extends to the local level. 

Following the Nigerien coup, the African Union and ECOWAS insisted on the reinstatement of the deposed president. Meanwhile, the United States threatened to end support to Niger, and the European Union and France suspended aid and cooperation. This appeared to show a united front between the West and African regional groups in defending democracy and security in a volatile region of a continent rife with autocracy. While it seems unlikely that Niger’s most recent coup will turn into war in West Africa, it is imperative that the European Union and the United States continue to prioritize relations with the African Union and ECOWAS. Optimistically, sanctions and clear stances by neighbors will turn public opinion away from the putschists – giving actors for democracy favor in negotiations likely to happen between ECOWAS and Niger. The Malian military leader’s recent phone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin may suggest this united approach by European states, the United States, African Union, and ECOWAS is placing enough pressure on junta-run countries that they are now seeking outside assistance. 

The Militant Threat 

The series of coups in West Africa has opened the door for extremist groups to expand after being pushed out of Iraq and Syria. The lack of government continuity, clear constitutional structures, and proper democratic governance allowed Salafist Jihadist groups to fill power vacuums in the region.  

The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and al Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) thrive in the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger tri-state. These groups are connected to other al Qaeda and ISIS outfits. However, Niger has served as a vast geographic buffer between the region’s new terrorist hot zone and North Africa, other West African states, and the Lake Chad Basin. Other states in the region have benefited from Niger’s anti-terrorism partnerships, including Libya, which is still healing; a number of West African states that have or are pursuing constitutional and civilian rule; and Nigeria, the richest and most populous country in Africa. 

Current political uncertainty in Niger – a counterterrorism champion of the region and the West – directly impacts anti-terrorism efforts in West Africa. In consideration of the strength and rate of territorial expansion by ISGS and JNIM, efforts that promote stability must be unwavering and immediate or these jihadist groups will grow at an unprecedented rate. Only a strong and united response from the international community that legitimizes African institutions will discourage coups and the spread of insurgent activities in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.  

Freedom from autocratic rule and lack of ramifications for coups directly supports jihadist growth in West Africa. Al Qaeda and ISIS will continue to take advantage of instability in West Africa if Tinubu and/or ECOWAS and the African Union fail to unite West African states and international partners motivated by peace and stability in the region. Poor governance feeds distrust in the state, which feeds ISIS and al Qaeda’s recruitment in the region. In West Africa, recruitment is not founded on the radicalization of youth and other individuals to jihadist ideology but by the grievances these individuals have against their own governments. 

Policy Recommendations  

The conditions that lead to state fragility and political and military coups are dynamic and require a multifaceted approach; however, before the resulting violence is addressed, the root causes of that fragility should be addressed. For there to be any progress, countries plagued by recurring political coups must make radical changes for the better. This includes increasing civic engagement and increasing educational spending to assist in bolstering the economy and tackling youth unemployment. Governments should also work to install proper democratic practices, including formalized constitutions and judiciary practices. Countries that begin this process must have support from the international and regional communities.  

The international community could aim sanctions more precisely to keep from harming innocent citizens who have not participated in or supported the coup. Responses by ECOWAS, the European Union, and France to Niger’s coup have choked regional banking and closed Niger’s borders. Instead, sanctions should target the finances and movement of coup members to avoid unwarranted economic backlash. 

Regional groups such as the African Union and ECOWAS should adopt clear and concise policies on intervention that are unaffected by relationships held with country leaders or past legacies, nor should these policies be able to change as ECOWAS leadership changes. ECOWAS and the African Union should develop an internationally supported threshold for what classifies as a coup with clear steps for escalation. Escalation can mean imposing sanctions or intervening militarily. Once capacity is built up and regional institutions have the framework to combat coups, steps can be taken to combat subsequent security concerns and increasing extremist activity.  

The United States must formally connect AFRICOM leadership and State Department conflict prevention, counterterrorism, and Africa bureaus with ECOWAS and the African Union. Due to the nature of al Qaeda and ISIS global terrorism networks and how the affiliates of these groups identify targets, especially as informed by foreign engagement grievances and/or colonial histories, it is imperative that counterterrorism efforts be comprehensive and disseminated through African and regional leadership.  

Structural change that supports good governance in West Africa must be the center to this comprehensive, African-led approach. Good governance and fair interactions with security forces are the only way to quell terrorist recruitment of aggrieved citizens in West Africa. Non-radicalized individuals are engaging with offshoots of al Qaeda and ISIS for two main reasons: indiscriminate targeting by government forces and lack of access to basic services and rights of citizenship. These are pervasive problems, especially in the rural and northern regions of these states. 

It is crucial that as ECOWAS, the African Union, and international partners address regional and state-level instability created by the coup in Niger to ensure that responsible intra-state governance and state security efforts are maintained. Adequate support from the United States and all international partners to the African Union and ECOWAS will make it possible to address state governance issues while encouraging responsible intra-state security and stability. This support must be transparent and engage local actors to strengthen the trust whose fragility has led to coups in the first place.  

Riley Moeder is a Senior Analyst for the Special Initiatives program at the New Lines Institute, focusing her research on North Africa and Strategic Rivalries. Prior to joining the New Lines Institute, Riley was a program assistant for the United States Institute of Peace in the Middle East and North Africa department. She previously worked at American Enterprises Institute in the Critical Threats Department, researching non-state actors in the Sahel. She also studied in Strasbourg, France, where she researched international human rights law and refugee policy.

Tammy Palacios is a Senior Analyst leading the Priority Sustainable Counterterrorism initiative at the New Lines Institute. Palacios previously served as Program Head for the Nonstate Actors program at New Lines, where she worked in the field of violent and non-violent non-state actors. Prior to joining the New Lines Institute, Tammy served as Project Lead for the MENA Research Team at TTCSP, where she managed two international teams collecting data on think tanks and civil society organizations in the MENA region. Tammy also spent time on Syria and ISIS portfolios at the Institute for the Study of War where she focused on Salafi-Jihadist militant groups operating in Syria. She tweets at @TammyPalacios10

The threat of military force to end the coup in Niger has led to significant divisions in the region.

It has heightened tensions in Niger itself, as well as among its neighbours.

There are more and more signs that any military intervention is likely to be met with stiff opposition. Growing support for the junta has emboldened the coup plotters to stay in power and call the bluff of the Economic Community of West African States, Ecowas.

In reaction to the threat of force, more Nigeriens took to the streets to show their opposition, with one protest held close to a French military base in Niamey.

The option of military force has divided countries in west Africa and the Sahel. Ecowas members are fully aware that an all-out war would increase the fragility of the region. A meeting of Ecowas military chiefs in Ghana on 17 and 18 August will discuss intervention options.

Meanwhile, the Ecowas parliament is divided over a military intervention. Member countries such as Nigeria, which currently holds the rotating chair, are also being put under internal pressure. Protesters took to the streets in Kano, the biggest city in northern Nigeria, against a possible invasion of Niger.

For their part, countries that neighbour Niger but do not belong to Ecowas, such as Chad and Algeria, have opposed the use of force.

As a scholar of politics and international relations, I believe that a military intervention in Niger is unlikely, as I have previously stated. However, the threat of force means tensions remain high. This is understandable as a great deal is at stake. I have identified three major implications of a full-blown war.

The first casualty would be the ongoing regional war against terrorism because countries currently committed to this fight would have their armies and resources diverted.

The second is that there would be a mass influx of refugees into the seven countries bordering Niger. This would have a knock-on effect as more refugees seek to find their way to Europe.

The third is that the conflict would heighten tensions between Niger and France. The junta blames France for the country’s insecurity and economic woes.

Counting the cost of war

Nigerien soldiers, through the G5-Sahel and Multinational Joint Task Force, are involved in the fight against Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and other terrorist groups around the Lake Chad Basin and other regions of the country. An attack led by Ecowas on Niger would distract the soldiers and divert critical resources.

Terrorist groups could then take advantage of borders weakened by conflict. They could also benefit from a situation where armies which previously fought side by side against insurgents such as Boko Haram and ISWAP were now fighting one another.

The example of Syria and how ISIS quickly emerged in the region gives a glimpse of what could happen.

Most of the Nigerien population lives in the southern part of the country next to the borders with Nigeria, Republic of Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali. These countries would suffer an influx of refugees, further destabilising what are already fragile states.

A war between the Nigerien military and Ecowas would embolden human traffickers and lead to more Africans taking advantage of the chaos to travel north towards Europe.

Niger has several bilateral and multilateral arrangements with the European Union and other countries in Europe to curb mass migration through Libya and the Mediterranean sea.

Agadez in central Niger used to be a major hub for illegal migration but this has changed as a result of the concerted effort between Niger and its European allies.

Military intervention would lead to a total collapse of the relationship between France and Niger’s people. There is already anger among a large part of the Nigerien public against the former colonial master and its activities in the country.

Niger was a French colony from 1922 till independence in 1960 and Paris has continued to play a critical role in the domestic political and economic affairs of the country.

If people believe that Ecowas is being pushed to take military action by France and its allies, Nigeriens could look to Russia which has issued its own warning against military intervention.

While Russia might not have the capacity and resources to fully mobilise in support of the junta, it might engage the Wagner Group, the Russia-backed private military contractor, which already has a presence in neighbouring Mali.

Russia has been careful not to support the coup plotters so as not to upset its allies in Africa, such as South Africa and Namibia, who both oppose the coup. But a full-scale military intervention would provide Moscow with an opportunity to get involved and “gain another ally”. The military leaders in Burkina Faso for instance have been strengthening  their relationship with Russia.

Limited options

Ecowas is desperate to “do something” after the junta defied its seven-day ultimatum to step down.

Meanwhile, the junta is not showing any signs of backing down.

I think the best option is to rule out military action and to negotiate a short transition period to restore democracy.

In line with the mandate of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, NIMASA, which includes safe shipping and cleaner oceans, a team comprising of Search and Rescue and marine accident investigation officers have been dispatched to the scene of the incident involving the Majestic Rig belonging to Depthwize Nigeria Limited, which capsized at Ovhor in Warri, Delta State.

Initial findings has confirmed that the ill-fated Rig is Panama Flagged and has been operating on Nigerian waters since 2016 without requisite approvals from the Agency.

The ABS Classed inland Water Drilling 232 feet-long Barge, with a rated drilling depth of 30,000 feet collapsed where it was been towed from N04, 30:34 / E00543:57 enroute Ovhor 21 that belongs to SEPLAT Oil field in Delta State.

NIMASA has initiated contact with the Clean Nigerian Associate, a conglomerate of all International Oil Companies (IOCs’) responsible for the cleaning of Tier 2 oil spill, to establish the level of spillage at the scene of the incident.

In addition, the Agency is in communication with officials of SEPLAT Energy Limited chatterers of the ill-fated Rig who are expected to officially report the incidence within 24 hours in line with the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 2007.

This information is for the public to please take note.

Osagie Edward

Assistant Director,

Public Relations, NIMASA

This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

President Bola Tinubu will administer the oath of office to his recently appointed ministers on Monday, August 21st. This follows the allocation of portfolios to the ministerial appointees, as announced by the Presidency on Wednesday, August 16th.

The official communication was conveyed by George Akume, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, through a press release signed by Willie Bassey.

The swearing-in ceremony is scheduled for 10:00 am at the State House Conference Centre in Abuja. This will be preceeded by a retreat to be conducted by the office the SGF.

On Wednesday, the Presidency disclosed the portfolios of the ministerial appointees, shedding light on the distinct roles and responsibilities that each minister will undertake.

Notably absent among the unveiled portfolios was that of the Minister of Petroleum Resources, which THE WHISTLER has learned may be retained by the president.

Nasir El-Rufai, the immediate past governor of Kaduna State, did not pass the ministerial screening conducted by the Senate.

Below is the full list of the ministers-designate and their portfolios.

Minister of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy, Bosun Tijani
Minister of State, Environment and Ecological Management, Ishak Salako
Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister of the Economy : Wale Edun
Minister of Marine and Blue Economy, Bunmi Tunji
Minister of Power, Adebayo Adelabu
Minister of State, Health and Social Welfare, Tunisia Alausa
Minister of Solid Minerals Development, Dele Alake
Minister of Tourism, Lola Ade-John
Minister of Transportation, Adegboyega Oyetola
Minister of Industry, Trade and Investment, Doris Aniete
Minister of Innovation Science and Technology, Uche Nnaji
Minister of State, Labour and Employment, Nkiruka Onyejeocha
Minister of Women Affairs, Uju Kennedy
Minister of Works, David Umahi
Minister of Aviation and Aerospace Development, Festus Keyamo
Minister of Youth, Abubakar Momoh
Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Poverty Alleviation, Betta Edu
Minister of State, Gas Resources, Ekperikpe Ekpo
Minister of State, Petroleum Resources, Heineken Lokpobiri
Minister of Sports Development, John Enoh
Minister of Federal Capital Territory, Nyesom Wike
Minister of Art, Culture and the Creative Economy, Hannatu Musawa
Minister of Defence, Mohammed Badaru
Minister of State Defence, Bello Matawalle
Minister of State Education, Yusuf T. Sunumu
Minister of Housing and Urban Development, Ahmed M. Dangiwa
Minister of State, Housing and Urban Development, Abdullah T. Gwarzo
Minister of Budget and Economic Planning, Atiku Bagudu
Minister of State, Federal Capital Territory, Mairiga Mahmud
Minister of State, Water Resources and Sanitation, Bello M. Goronyo
Minister of Agriculture and Food Security, Abubakar Kyar
Minister of Education, Tahir Maman
Minister of Interior, Sa’Idu A. Alkali
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yusuf M. Tuggar
Coordinating Minister of Health and Social Welfare, Ali Pate
Minister of Police Affairs, Ibrahim Geidam
Minister of State, Steel Development, U. Maigari Ahmadu
Minister of Steel Development, Shuaibu A. Audu
Minister of Information and National Orientation, Muhammed Idris
Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Lateef Fagbemi
Minister of Labour and Employment, Simon B. Lalong
Minister of State, Police Affairs, Imaan Sulaiman-Ibrahim
Minister of Special Duties and Inter-Govermental Affairs, Zephaniah Jisalo
Minister of Water Resources and Sanitation, Joseph Utsev
Minister of State, Agriculture and Food Security, Aliyu Sabi Abdullahi
Minister of Environment and Ecological Management, (Kaduna)

Cross River State Governor, Senator Bassey Otu, has taken a strong stance against the rising kidnapping and criminal activities within the state.

Speaking at the swearing-in ceremony for new commissioners in Calabar, Otu announced a crackdown on criminals and urged law enforcement agencies to apprehend and prosecute offenders in accordance with state laws.

Otu expressed his frustration with the prevailing insecurity, emphasizing that the safety of the state is everyone’s responsibility.

He encouraged citizens to provide information about suspicious individuals in their communities and assured their protection. The governor also pledged rewards for valuable information that leads to the arrest of criminals.

“Let’s take responsibility for the security of our dear state because these people are not foreigners but those around us. We are going to put a fee on whistleblowing. Anybody you suspect in your neighborhood, please pass on the information and you will be protected,” the governor was quoted as saying by his Chief Press Secretary, Emmanuel Ogbeche.

The governor directed security heads to utilize all available resources to swiftly put an end to these criminal acts, secure the release of hostages, and restore the state’s peace and reputation.

Citing the Cross River State Kidnapping Prohibition Law of 2016, Otu outlined stringent penalties for kidnappers, including death by hanging and lengthy imprisonment for attempted kidnappings. He affirmed his commitment to enforcing these laws rigorously to eradicate criminal activities.

Otu conveyed his determination to end the era of insecurity, asserting that the time for change is now. He expressed his willingness to collaborate with various stakeholders to alleviate the impact of economic challenges without resorting to criminal actions.

The Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) has expressed concern over the increasing incidents of academic staff from universities, polytechnics, and Colleges of Education (CoE) fleeing once they are sent abroad on scholarships by the agency.

The Executive Secretary, Sonny Echono, stated that these cases are embarrassing, prompting the need to revise the foreign scholarship programs. The aim is to strengthen the selection criteria and ensure that beneficiaries do not abscond in the future.

Echono addressed the heads of benefiting institutions in Abuja during a stakeholders’ engagement on emerging issues affecting TETFund’s interventions. He urged participants to collaborate with TETFund in recommending credible scholars for foreign scholarships.

“We are entrusted with the responsibility of rehabilitating the physical infrastructure and other content aspects of the nation’s entire public tertiary institutions. We have successfully sponsored over 37,000 scholars for both foreign and local PhDs, Masters, Bench Work, and Postdoctoral programs in various institutions within and outside Nigeria.”

“Sadly, we are having growing cases of scholars’ abscondment, scholars not returning to serve their bonds at their home institutions upon completion of their programs. In fact, the challenge of scholars absconding has undermined and complicated TETFund’s scholarship for Academic Staff (TSAS) program, thus bringing it under intense scrutiny.”

Echono explained that the stakeholders’ engagement aimed to address these challenges and find solutions for the effective implementation of scholarship programs. He highlighted the recently signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with prestigious institutions overseas to enhance the TSAS program.

The purpose of the engagement was to encourage open dialogue and collaboration among key stakeholders of the Fund to enhance the effectiveness of TETFund’s intervention programs. Echono emphasized that stakeholders’ collective insights, ideas, and feedback are crucial for driving positive changes and accelerating educational sector development.

“As an agency of the government tasked with rebuilding and supporting the nation’s tertiary institutions, we are fully aware of the enormous responsibility and task before us, especially considering the importance of tertiary education in nation-building.”

Echono also addressed the impact of rising inflation on the Fund’s interventions, stating the need to reconsider fixed cost regimes and adapt interventions to inflation rates and project lifecycles. He also emphasized the importance of comprehensive equipment audits to ensure efficient utilization of resources and avoid duplication in subsequent interventions.

A good number of people, including me, seems opposed to Nigeria leading the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to war in Niger. In one of the most telling anti-war metaphors, a Nigerian columnist and Editor, Lasisi Olagunju, likened military intervention to rubbing buttocks with the porcupine. 

Doves everywhere are flying the flag of peace. Protesters are also waving placards reminding Nigeria’s President and ECOWAS Chairman, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, not to start a war he cannot finish.

As if he doesn’t know, Tinubu has also been reminded, among other things, that there’s already too much trouble at home – insecurity, economic hardship and a country deeply divided by the last elections – without a clear plan, so far, how to dig himself out of the mess. He cannot invite more trouble.

Tinubu is not just being told to mind his business, fix Nigeria and forget war. In what is clearly an indication that even the pacificists recognise that he cannot ignore a problem at the door, however, the president has also been advised to prioritise talks and negotiations with Niger’s military leader, General Abdourahmane Tchiana, who deposed President Mohamed Bazoum and seized power on July 26.

That is easier said than done. I’ve been forced to pause and lower my flag for talks at half-mast after reading one of Christopher Hitchens’ essays in his collection, And Yet, from which I have adapted the title of this article. 

Hitchens wasn’t writing about Niger, of course: it was about the US Middle East policy at a very difficult and dangerous time. At the height of Iran’s nuclear enrichment controversy, the Obama administration received a letter from Tehran offering “unconditional talks”, over the hostile and fraught relationship between Washington and Tehran. 

The invitation to “unconditional talks” with Iran’s President, Mahmoud Ahmedinajad, characteristised in Washington as the devil incarnate, spooked memories of Azar Nafisi’s 2003 book, Reading Lolita in Tehran, in which she said a relationship with the Islamic Republic “is like having sex with a man you loathe.” I honestly don’t know which one is easier – rubbing buttocks with the porcupine or having sex with a man you loathe!

The instigation for talks, at all costs, with Niger’s military junta must feel that way for Tinubu. How do you talk with a man who not only despises your election and questionsthe legitimacy of other regional leaders, but one who has also spurned your emissaries and is openly rallying other scoundrels against you and the regional body? 

It’s gratifying that the latest indications from Niamey are that the military regime is prepared for talks with ECOWAS. But what, in any case, would such talks be likein light of the regional protocol by all 15-member ECOWAS countries, including Niger, against unconstitutional changes in government?  

A chapter from the encounter of regional leaders and the diaries of three regional military coup leaders in the last few years could give us an idea. The soles of the shoes of ECOWAS special envoy and former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and his team are worn out from futile diplomatic visits to Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso after soldiers seized power in these countries, and for three years, all refused to talk sense. 

Assimi Goita, Mali’s military leader, seized power in 2020 and initially promised a transitional government within six months. Before you could say Assimi, however, he sacked the figure-head interim government in May 2021 and promised elections would be held in 2024, that is four years after he first seized power.

Guinean military leader Mamadi Doumbouya, who seized power in September 2021 was careful not to commit early. After about five months in power, plenty of talk and ECOWAS sanctions which all parties knew were just about as empty as the talks, Doumbouya announced in January last year that he needed an extra 39 months to hand over power.  

And just around the corner, Ibrahim Traore, Burkinabe’s military leader and the third soldier to lead a successful coup in the region in five years, has not made any secrets of his flirtations with the Russian-backed Wagner Group. 

The hint of a transition is not even on the table, much less discussions with ECOWAS about a possible hand over date. Anyone who saw Traore’s recent red-carpet reception by Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow might understand why he cannot be in a hurry to leave power. Better to talk about talk and enjoy the illegitimate fruit of power than to confront the threat of a forceful removal. 

It is in the context of this catastrophic failure of previous talks with military juntas in the last three years, not to mention the audacity of their defiance, that we must view any talks with Tchiani. It is either we have decided to shred the protocol against unconstitutional changes in government and return to the 1970s/80s by normalisingmilitary rule, or we make it clear that there would be consequences for military coups. 

The argument that we have ourselves to blame because civilian rulers have performed shabbily, wangled their way into office, or illegally extended their tenure is seductive but untenable. To adapt the Italian prosecutor Virgino Rognoni, who took on the Red Brigades in the 1908s, “in whichever way a democratic system might be sick, military coup will not heal it; it kills it. Democracy is healed with democracy.”

We can all agree that talk is better than war, but those who are willing to turn a blind eye to the futility of talks in the last three years since the fall of Mali have not said how more pillow talk with Tchiani would do for Niger what it has failed to do for the embarrassingly defiant coup belt. 

It’s been said that the “hasty” announcement of a military option by ECOWAS and sanctions by the body, especially Nigeria’s decision to cut-off electricity to Niamey, hardened the junta. Maybe. But the junta’s response to diplomatic overtures made right after did not suggest that sending flowers early on would have made much difference. 

Tchiani’s latest comment that the military government has enough evidence to try President Bazoum for high treason is a ridiculous excuse to buy time and befuddle the point. It is a measure of how unpromising the talks would be that an illegitimate government is even thinking of charging an elected president with “high treason!” 

How did we get here? By talking, of course, without any clear intention of, or will to do anything, when talks failed. Wasn’t it an embarrassment to ECOWAS, for example, that in spite of promises by the Malian military leader to hand over within a few months of the coup, the military-dominated legislature later announced that nothing less than four years would do, to which ECOWAS negotiator, Jonathan, tamely replied, “I believe ECOWAS may not accept it…we’re going to negotiate further with them.” 

Seven months after Jonathan made this statement, the soldiers in Burkina Faso read correctly that it was just another empty talk. They struck.

If, in 2016, ECOWAS had offered President Yahya Jammeh talks, instead of deploying a regional force to remove him from power after he lost elections and refused to quit, he’ll probably still be in office today, talking.  

Sure, regional leaders could do better by using institutional mechanisms such as the AU’s Peer Review to improve the quality of governance and perhaps even review the governance charter. 

Yet, there’s no evidence in Africa that the military has done any better after seizing power. It’s time to end the nonsense in Niger not by rubbing buttocks with Tchiani, but by keeping the cage-trap firmly on the table for this porcupine and his cohorts.

The Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) has unveiled plans to demolish approximately 500 illegal houses and structures in Dutsen-Garki, Apo District, Abuja.

Mr. Mukhtar Galadima, the Director of the Department of Development Control at FCTA, revealed this decision following a meeting with community leaders in Abuja.

Represented by Mr. Hassan Ogbole, the Deputy Director of Monitoring and Enforcement, Galadima stated that all illegally acquired or constructed houses and structures would be subject to demolition.

He expressed concern over the unauthorized acquisition and development of properties and lands by individuals without obtaining approval from FCTA, deeming this practice unacceptable.

The purpose of the meeting with the locals aligns with FCTA’s reform agenda, focusing on consulting natives prior to any demolition exercise in order to avoid surprising the community.

Galadima emphasized that the meeting aimed to inform community leaders and the public about the forthcoming demolition operation.

In collaboration with the community leaders, FCTA has agreed to mark houses and structures illegally erected by non-indigenous residents within two weeks, followed by the actual demolition.

The Director cautioned residents against seeking land acquisition from locals, urging them to approach the appropriate authorities to prevent property losses.

He further advised against selling lands or expanding properties without obtaining FCTA’s approval.

Mr. Kak Bello, Deputy Director of Monitoring and Enforcement at Abuja Environmental Protection Board, emphasized that not only are illegal structures erected, but buildings are also constructed in waterways.

Building on flood plains and disposing of refuse in waterways contribute to environmental problems experienced in parts of FCT, Bello noted.

He encouraged people to adhere to the law, refrain from illegal construction, and avoid building on flood plains.

Mr. Danjuma Fanus, a community representative, assured full cooperation from the community leaders for the successful execution of the exercise.

However, Fanus appealed to FCTA to approach the exercise considerately to ensure that no natives become victims.

“We are committed to working with the authorities, but we also seek your cooperation,” he emphasized.

There is no doubt that the sanctions imposed on Niger by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in response to the 26 July military coup that toppled the government of elected President Mohamed Bazoum, are biting hard, especially the suspension of electricity supply by Nigeria,

After last weekend’s meeting in Niamey with a delegation of Muslim Scholars) Ulamas from Nigeria, the Brig.-General Abdourahamane-led junta began singing a different tune from their pervious uncompromising stance.

It was announced after that meeting that the junta leaders were now ready to dialogue with ECOWAS, having treated with disrespect a delegation from the organization led by former Nigerian military Head of State Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar, and also refused to receive a joint ECOWAS-AU-UN Mission.

The soldiers were reportedly angry that ECOWAS “did not hear their side of the story before imposing the sanctions,” and also threated the use military force if detained Bazoum was not released and reinstated within seven days.

The seven-day ultimatum had since passed without any military intervention as the Niamey junta rather consolidates its hold on power by announcing military regional governors and a cabinet of 21 ministers headed by a civilian Prime Minister Ali Lamine Zeine. Zeine also doubles as Finance Minister in the cabinet with soldiers holding key portfolios of defence and internal affairs.

At their second emergency summit on the Niger crisis on 10^th August in Abuja, regional leaders had ordered the deployment of the ECOWAS Standby Force to restore constitutional order in Niger. They had further directed “the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff to activate the ECOWAS Standby Force in all its elements immediately.”

But in the intervening period, it emerged that Tchiani and his junta colleagues received the group of Muslim Ulamas led by Sheik Bala Lau.

Both sides were reported to have agreed that dialogue with ECOWAS was a better option for the resolution of the Niger impasse.

Officials of the military regime were also reported to have praised ECOWAS as an important regional organization, stressing the need for diplomacy, and appealing for lifting of the regional sanctions.

But shortly after that seemingly positive development, the junta announced that it would charge detained Bazoum with high treason for allegedly inviting foreign forces to attack Niger.

ECOWAS responded by expressing “stupefied” anger, condemning the junta move junta as provocative. The regional bloc further reiterated that Bazoum remained the democratically elected president of Niger.

Meanwhile, it is becoming obvious that while the ECOWAS threat for the use of military force might have played a part, the impacts of the regional sanctions, especially the cut of electricity supply have proved a most effective weapon that can force the junta to the negotiating table.

Apart from Niger, three other ECOWAS member States - Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso are now under military dictatorships, with Mali and Burkina Faso vowing to join forces with Niger against the ECOWAS planned military intervention.

Somehow, the use of force in Niger is growing unpopular based on the fear that it could snowball into a catastrophic enterprise. There is opposition in some ECOWAS member States including Nigeria, Niger’s key neighbour, which is expected to play a major part in such a venture.

Also, Algeria and Mauritania, Niger’s neighbours in the Sahel would prefer diplomatic initiatives.

As ECOWAS military chiefs hold their second emergency meeting in Accra, Ghana 17-18 August since receiving the marching orders for the activation of the Standby Force from the reginal leaders on 10^th August, the general expectation is that ECOWAS would stay on the message, still holding up the military card, but at the same time, allow parallel backend diplomatic efforts to continue.

Doubtless, the military coup in Niger is one too many in the ECOWAS region. But it is also true that military incursion into politics in the politically restive region, is only a symptom of the perennial systemic failure of governance systems, characterised by corruption, mismanagement, vote rigging, disregard for the rule of law and human rights violations.

Some leaders in the region have blatantly altered national constitutions to gain or retain power, amid disturbing trends of godfatherism, state capture, personalisation of democracy and undemocratic control of the legislature and the judiciary by the executive arms of government.

Soldiers belong in their barracks for the protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. But the hypocritical tendency of always jumping to condemn military coups, while allowing political leaders to continue with impunity, generates public anger, especially when peaceful street protests are often met with ruthless repression by the politicians.

In the case of Niger, internal power struggle between Bazoum and his godfather, former President Mahamadou Issoufou, coupled with the ousted president’s plan to carry out major changes in government institutions, including the armed forces, might have triggered the putsch, foreign interference is also playing a major part.

Niger is a major Western ally, especially the United State and France. Both have military bases in the country.

For hosting America’s key military facilities, including intelligence gathering drones, and also assisting Western countries to stop immigration from Africa, Niger was receiving foreign assistance worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

In addition, the country is also rich in natural resources particularly uranium, which is very useful for nuclear power generation, although this is exploited by Western companies for the benefit of their countries.

For instance, France uses Niger’s uranium to generate about 70% of its power supply while 80% of Niger’s estimated 26 million people wallow in darkness, with the country on the bottom rung of the UN Human Development ranking.

There is also growing anti-French sentiment in Niger and other French former colonies in Africa. This has found expression in sporadic street protests, with some protesters destroying the French national flags while others hold aloft the Russia flags, in what is interpreted as an appeal for Moscow’s support.

The junta leaders have already recalled Niger’s ambassador from France and suspended Niger’s uranium supply contract with France, with every indication that like their colleagues in Mali and Burkina Faso, they are leaning toward Russia, which has expressed opposition to military intervention in Niger. Tchiani is actually reported to have had a phone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The head of Russia’s private military group, Wagner, has also welcomed the Niger coup as “a positive development,” although no indication that the group is ready to send soldiers to Niger.

To underscore Niger’s strategic interest to its Western allies, the American Secretary of State Antony Blinken, has continued follow developments in Niger, praising ECOWAS and its current Chairman, Nigerian President Ahmed Bola Tinubu for their “efforts” in Niger.

Paradoxically, while America and some Western countries have evacuated their citizens from Niger, Washington has announced plans to send its new Ambassador to Niamey at a time ECOWAS is threatening military intervention.

The more reason ECOWAS will be well-advised to continue to explore diplomatic and peaceful resolution of the Niger crisis, to avoid a dangerous backlash, especially in Nigeria, the regional powerhouse, and by extension, the entire region. Also, Bazoum’s life could further be jeopardised.

The Niger junta, too, must realise that it cannot take on ECOWAS in the event of kinetic option.

The prognosis looks rather grim for deposed President Bazoum, and France, which is losing hold in its former colonies, even as Russia continue its inroad in Africa, despite the pathological fears of the West.

The way forward is for Paris to review its policy towards Africa, otherwise, the citizens appear determined to free their countries from the suffocating and overbearing French influence.

Even if Bazoum were to escape jail sentence for alleged treason, he is unlikely to be reinstated. He has apparently lost the loyalty of the Niger armed forces and might pay for the strained relations between him and his godfather, Issoufou, assuming his erstwhile Western allies are also not done with him.

When Bazoum had the opportunity to speak out from the junta detention, he only called for his release and reinstatement, without any consideration for the long-suffering citizens, who bear the brunt of coups and bad governance.

His reinstatement will only make nonsense of whatever reason/s canvased by the junta for the coup, so a short transition period of six to nine months for the election of new civilian government seems a most likely solution to the Niger crisis. ECOWAS should not be dragged into a deadly and risky proxy war.

A major lesson from the geopolitical game in Niger and other Francophone coup countries is that solutions to African problems are in Africa and that relations with foreign countries, be they America and its Western allies, Russia, China, or any other country for that matter, must be based on equal partnerships with the interests of the majority of Africans as the priority.

Paul Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security and Governance Communications